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Can just war theory provide a framework for thinking about international 
distributive justice? At first glance, it seems odd to suggest that we can 
transfer insights from warfare to the issue of distribution. However, if the term 
“justice” is to have consistency across the realms of war and distribution, there 
should be common foundations that underlie these two spheres, such that we 
can speak of international justice more generally.  
In this project, I attempt to uncover foundational principles in just war theory 
that plausibly support principles of international distributive justice. First, I 
examine the rationale behind jus ad bellum (just cause for war) and argue that 
communal autonomy forms the basis for its principles. I then relate the 
concept of communal autonomy to the appropriate scope for international 
distribution. Second, I trace the process according to which jus in bello (just 
conduct in war) duties move from a negative duty (principle of double effect) 
to a positive duty (principle of due care) and finally to its limits (principle of 
due risk) to argue that the right to life informs each stage of the process. I then 
apply the right to life to the context of international distribution to make a case 
for the negative, positive and limits to duties involved that we are obliged to 
uphold. Finally, I end by relating the significance of these conclusions to the 





Can just war theory provide a framework for thinking about international 
distributive justice? At first glance, it seems odd to suggest that we can 
transfer thoughts on warfare to the issue of distribution. Scholarship seems to 
confirm our intuitions here. These topics generally represent distinct academic 
discussions in international political theory, with humanitarian intervention 
being one of the few points of overlap.1 However, if the term “justice” is to 
have consistency across the realms of war and distribution, there should be 
common foundations that underlie these two spheres, such that we can speak 
of international justice more generally.2 Let me suggest a few ways in which 
such an investigation can be fruitful.  
 
First, there is little consensus as to what international distributive justice is or 
should be about, whereas just war theory provides much more internal 
agreement and coherence.3 It would be ideal, then, for scholars to “take the 
moral principles that underlie and give coherence to just war discourse… and 
make those principles the basis of a discourse of international distributive 
justice.”4 In terms of internal agreement, scholars discussing the morality of 
war can largely define themselves as arguing within or against the just war 
paradigm. Just war theorists fall into the first category, whereas “realists, 
militarists, holy warriors… and pacifists” fall into the second.5 There is no 
such internal agreement within the international distributive justice literature. 
                                                
1 Terry Nardin, “International Political Theory and The Question of Justice.” International 
Affairs 82, No 3 (2006): 458. 
2 Ibid., 456-457. 
3 Ibid., 454-456. 
4 Ibid., 457. 
5 Ibid., 455. 
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A quick survey reveals that disagreement between the types of duties 
involved, where and how these duties come about, the nature of the subjects of 
justice and the question of what the scope of the duties are. 6 As for coherence, 
just war theory mainly concerns itself with conduct.7 This line of thought 
applies consistently across the various actors involved in war, be it states or 
individuals. In contrast, theories in international distributive justice generally 
evaluate either the process or the outcome of distribution. Some examples of 
process oriented theories include the libertarian approach to international 
distributive justice, whereas outcome oriented (or patterned) theories include 
strict egalitarianism and welfare-based accounts. Both approaches come with 
their own weaknesses: On the one hand, focusing exclusively on the process 
justifies (potentially) extremely unequal distributions, an outcome 
unacceptable to many. On the other hand, focusing exclusively on the outcome 
neglects the (morally relevant) history of how such a distribution emerged in 
the first place.8 Moving forward requires reconciling both these approaches to 
international distributive justice. 
 
Second, I would argue that there have been few attempts to address 
international distributive justice through just war theory. On the one hand, 
there has been some attempt to connect the topic of international distributive 
justice to just war theory through topics such as subsistence wars and 
redistributive wars. In contrast, there has been very little scholarship about 
                                                
6 Chris Armstrong, Global Distributive Justice: An Introduction. (Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), 14-39. 
7 Terry Nardin, “International Political Theory and The Question of Justice.” International 
Affairs 82, No 3 (2006): 456. 
8 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia. (Basic Books, 1971), 150. 
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how the reverse relationship of just war theory informing international 
distributive justice might apply. On the other hand, there has been some work 
done in relation to the common foundations that could belie war and 
distribution. However, the authors of such work do not go on to relate these 
common foundations back to international distributive justice, at least not 
adequately. I will now go through each of these claims in turn. 
 
The first account that relates international distributive justice to just war 
theory belongs to Cecile Fabre, who has dedicated one chapter in her book, 
Cosmopolitan War, to the topic of subsistence war. According to Fabre, 
subsistence wars can be understood as situations where “violations of 
subsistence rights (to the material resources we need to lead a minimally 
decent life)” give individuals a basis for waging war.9 Her goal, then, is to 
establish that waging a war over reasons of subsistence constitutes a just 
cause.10 In Fabre’s view, the act of depriving communities of resources 
necessary for their survival is “tantamount to attacking the capacity for 
political self-determination of that community.”11 She provides three reasons 
to support her argument. First, a citizenry that faces severe deprivation loses 
their capacity for exercising their political rights, such as voting.12  This 
capacity loss could be due to multiple factors, such as their need to make a 
living (leaving them with no time for or interest in politics) or how they 
become exceedingly vulnerable to bribery from local politicians.13 Second, a 
citizenry that is focuses primarily on meeting its basic needs also loses its 
                                                
9 Cecile Fabre. Cosmopolitan War. (Oxford University Press, 2012), 97. 
10 Ibid., 97. 
11 Ibid., 107. 
12 Ibid., 108. 
13 Ibid., 108. 
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ability to “engage in… collective projects” that shape much of the value and 
meaning of communal life.14 Third, if we consider the notion of security more 
broadly in economic terms, where a political community loses its ability to 
function as normal when faced with economic sanctions such as embargoes, 
one could also see severe deprivation as a means of undermining self-
determination.15  
 
One objection to Fabre’s argument would be that harm caused through severe 
deprivation is not analogous to harm incurred as a result of an armed attack.16 
The analogy fails for two reasons. First, some might note that these two types 
of harm are different in nature and should thereby elicit different responses. 
Second, unlike an armed attack, severe deprivation may not be an intentional 
act on the parts of those who are causally responsible. Fabre responds to the 
second reason by recognizing the conceptual distinction between affluent 
countries subjecting their poorer counterparts to severe deprivation and merely 
failing to provide assistance.17 However, she rejects the moral distinction 
between the two cases and considers both to provide just causes for war.18 It 
sum, Fabre seems to endorse a view that a right to lead “a minimally decent 
life” licenses us to act in ways even as extreme as war.19 
 
The second account belongs to Lippert-Rasmussen, who picked up on the 
theme of how just war theory can relate to international distributive justice in 
                                                
14 Ibid., 108. 
15 Ibid., 108. 
16 Ibid., 110. 
17 Ibid., 111-112 . 
18 Ibid., 111-112. 
19 Ibid., 129. 
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relation to distributive wars. Unlike Fabre who discusses the notion of 
subsistence wars generally, Lippert-Rasmussen focuses on Thomas Pogge’s 
international distributive justice theory and attempts to flesh out the 
implications of Pogge’s theory in particular.20 More specifically, Lippert-
Rasmussen argues poorer countries are eligible to “start just, and even 
possibly, morally permissible redistributive wars” against their richer 
counterparts assuming that Pogge’s account of global poverty proves true.21  
 
According to Lippert-Rasmussen, Pogge’s argument can be distilled into two 
main points. First,  “powerful Western states” impose a global institutional 
order that is designed strongly in their favour upon other weaker states. 22 
Second, this global institutional order is unjust in terms of its effects, for 
millions are left “impoverished in a way that will violate their human rights”.23 
After establishing these two points, Lippert-Rasmussen goes on to make a 
case for redistributive wars by considering how they might fulfill the criteria 
for jus ad bellum (just conditions for waging war).24 Lippert-Rasmussen is 
most interested in the just cause criterion. He makes two points to argue that 
redistributive wars can fulfill the requirements for a just cause. First, Lippert-
Rasmussen argues that “the distinction between military and non-military 
aggression may not be entirely clear-cut”.25 For example, the use of devices 
that “jam computers” can also be seen as a form of aggression, for these 
devices also have the effect of incapacitating the normal functioning of a 
                                                
20 Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen. “Global Justice and Redistributive Wars”, Law, Ethics and 
Philosophy. 1 (2013): 65. 
21 Ibid., 67. 
22 Ibid., 70. 
23 Ibid., 71. 
24 Ibid., 73. 
25 Ibid., 75. 
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political community.26 The implication of his argument is that the imposition 
of an unjust global structure can also be understood as a form of unwarranted 
aggression upon a polity, therefore justifying a redistributive war in the name 
of self-defense.27 Second, Lippert-Rasmussen contends that the intentions of 
the powerful states do not matter in terms of whether redistributive wars have 
a just cause or not. He makes this point by way of an analogy. According to 
Lippert-Rasmussen, a country that attacks another solely for the purpose of 
avoiding “violent internal political strife” still remains liable to be attacked in 
return, despite there being “no intention to subdue or harm” their victim.28 
Likewise, it makes no difference whether powerful states intend to cause 
severe deprivation (or not) through their imposition of an unjust global order, 
the effects of their imposition suffice as a just cause for retaliation.29 Finally, 
Lippert-Rasmussen concludes by returning to just war theory itself and notes 
that the traditional jus ad bellum criteria can be revised to include 
redistributive wars as a form of defensive war.30  
 
The third account belongs to Thomas Pogge, who responds to Lippert-
Rasmussen’s article by strongly rejecting the argument that “(his) analysis of 
world poverty should make (him) more accepting of (what (Lippert-
Rasmussen) calls) redistributive wars.”31 Pogge refutes Lippert-Rasmussen’s 
argument by fleshing out the three main claims that Lippert-Rasmussen makes 
and then problematising each in turn. First, Pogge disagrees with Lippert-
                                                
26 Ibid., 75. 
27 Ibid., 75. 
28 Ibid., 75. 
29 Ibid., 75. 
30 Ibid., 84. 
31 Thomas Pogge. “Poverty and Violence”, Law, Ethics and Philosophy 1 (2013): 88. 
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Rasmussen that citizens in affluent countries forfeit their right to life because 
they participate in an unjust global order.32 On the one hand Pogge argues that 
one needs to be more discriminate in terms of holding individuals responsible 
for their participation in such an global order, noting that there are “large 
numbers of children and adolescents, many more or less active opponents of 
current government policies toward the world’s poor and also many people, 
who, poor or poorly educated, are themselves victims of economic injustice” 
who should be exempt from moral responsibility.33 On the other hand, Pogge 
argues that participating in such a global order does not warrant a forfeiture of 
one’s right to life.34 He considers “basic human rights” to be “inalienable” and 
it would be ironic if the basis for his theory ends up endorsing actions that 
violate this very bedrock.35  
 
Second, Pogge argues Lippert-Rasmussen makes several assumptions that are 
too unrealistic to be useful when it comes to guiding actions in the real world. 
Pogge’s point is that Lippert-Rasmussen’s argument loses traction when these 
assumptions come under fire. One example that Pogge raises is Lippert-
Rasmussen’s attempt to fulfill the jus ad bellum criterion of a reasonable 
chance of success. To elaborate, Lippert-Rasmussen asks his readers to 
imagine a situation where the affluent countries face an aging population with 
“most (being)…too old for military service”, whereas the poorer countries 
somehow “acquire weapons of mass destruction” and can easily draw upon a 
mass of young men who are willing to fight in order to craft a scenario where 
                                                
32 Ibid., 98. 
33 Ibid., 99. 
34 Ibid., 100. 
35 Ibid., 100. 
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redistributive wars might enjoy reasonable success.36 Pogge contends that 
such a scenario fails to take into account the technological superiority that 
wealthier countries enjoy, such as their possession of  “drones… aircraft 
carriers, fighter planes, submarines, nuclear weapons, surveillance and 
communications”.37 The possession of these military capabilities would more 
than make up for any disadvantages that come along with having older and 
fewer soldiers, thereby diminishing the possibility of military success.  
 
Finally, Pogge challenges Lippert-Rasmussen on the point that redistributive 
wars may be morally permissible. According to Lippert-Rasmussen, just war 
theory does not capture all the relevant moral considerations that factor into 
war making. 38  To elaborate, Lippert-Rasmussen suggest that the 
proportionality clause only applies to the party considering war but fails to 
capture the consideration of how the country that is attacked may respond.39 
Lippert-Rasmussen then uses the term “moral permissibility” to refer to this 
consideration. One instance of a just but morally impermissible war would be 
a war of self-defense but with devastating consequences, where the country 
being attacked could “harass ethnic or religious minorities that have some 
affiliation” to its attacker.40 Pogge disagrees with Lippert-Rasmussen that 
redistributive wars are morally permissible because he foresees that the 
backlash from affluent countries “might well be monumental”.41 He cites the 
historical record of the damage that the United States inflicted upon Nagasaki 
                                                
36 Ibid., 105. 
37 Ibid., 105. 
38 Ibid., 106. 
39 Ibid., 107. 
40 Ibid., 107. 
41 Ibid., 108. 
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and Vietnam as evidence for his argument and warns these “massive 
expectable harms” should serve as deterrence against redistributive wars. 
 
The fourth and final account belongs to Juha Räikkä, who comments on the 
debate between Lippert-Rasmussen and Pogge and eventually concludes that 
“Lippert-Rasmussen’s argument is not fully compelling, despite the fact that it 
highlights an important connection between issues of global distributive 
justice and a good old just war theory.”42 I will now highlight the two main 
points she makes to support his conclusion. First, Räikkä finds it troubling that 
Lippert-Rasmussen does not view the distinction between “an intentional 
attack” (such as a military attack) and harm done by those who “do not even 
know that they are doing so” (such as supporting an unjust global order) 
morally relevant.43 Räikkä disagrees with Lippert-Rasmussen’s diagnosis and 
argues that the distinction between the two is more properly framed in terms 
of there being “non-culpable ignorance” (or not), with the implication that 
deeds performed out of such ignorance become “themselves non-culpable”.44 
Evidence of such ignorance can be observed from the fact that an ordinary 
person could well be unaware of the reasons behind global poverty.45 Even if 
he or she has some awareness, the issue of global poverty is incredibly 
complex and Pogge’s argument “that rich countries are causally responsible 
for global poverty” remains “exceptionally controversial”.46 His point, then, is 
that both ordinary people and politicians could reasonably dispute Pogge’s 
                                                
42 Juha Räikkä. “Redistributive Wars and Just War Principles”, Ratio.Ru 12 (2014): 6. 
43 Ibid., 17. Emphasis original. 
44 Ibid., 19. Emphasis original. 
45 Ibid., 19. 
46 Ibid., 19. 
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account of international distributive justice and need not act in accordance 
with it.47 
 
Second, Räikkä agrees with Pogge that in the context of just war theory, one 
cannot transfer “the moral responsibility of some individual persons” to entire 
countries at large without careful consideration. 48  Räikkä recounts that 
Lippert-Rasmussen makes a case that the misdoings of some individuals (in 
terms of contributing to an unjust global order) could lead to the entire affluent 
country being liable to attack. 49  From Räikkä’s perspective, Lippert-
Rasmussen bases his argument on a comparison to how a military attack 
would be perceived in traditional just war theory, where a country that attacks 
another is in turn liable to being attacked, even if only a few soldiers (and not 
a significant proportion of the populace) were involved in the military effort.50 
However, Räikkä, like Pogge, argues that such a response is both 
disproportionate and indiscriminate. First, and most importantly, Lippert-
Rasmussen’s response is disproportionate because the imposition of an unjust 
global order should be remedied through other means such as institutional 
reform, rather than violence, even as a last resort.51 Second, his response is 
also indiscriminate because it is likely that only a few select individuals, such 
as “international business leaders, bankers or politicians”, should be held 
morally responsible for imposing an “unjust risk” to the global poor.52 
                                                
47 Ibid., 19. 
48 Ibid., 22. 
49 Ibid., 13. 
50 Ibid., 7. 
51 Ibid., 21-22. 
52 Ibid., 21. 
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Räikkä’s earlier point on non-culpable ignorance implies that the majority of 
laypersons can be relieved from moral responsibility in this context. 
 
Although Fabre, Lippert-Rasmussen, Pogge and Räikkä each raised thought 
provoking points, my earlier illustration of their arguments demonstrate that 
their research remains unidirectional in scope and do not consider how the 
reverse relationship between just war theory and international distributive 
justice may operate. It is precisely this gap in the literature that my thesis 
seeks to fill. In response, some may contend that research done on common 
foundations that underlie the two fields already serve to close this gap to a 
certain extent. My goal, then, is to demonstrate that there remains several 
important questions that the current scholarship on this topic has not yet 
managed to answer. 
 
The first account that explores the common foundations between just war 
theory and international distributive justice belongs to Terry Nardin, who uses 
humanitarian intervention as a conceptual bridge to connect the realm of just 
war to international distribution.53 From the just war perspective, a just cause 
for war is that of self-defence against external aggression. Humanitarian 
intervention makes use of this logic but turns it inward, for it is not defence 
against some foreign enemy, but one’s own government who wages war upon 
the people here. In both these cases, one could argue that there is not only a 
right but even a duty for other states to intervene, so as to protect the 
                                                
53 Terry Nardin, “International Political Theory and The Question of Justice.” International 
Affairs 82, No 3 (2006): 458.  
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innocent.54 The next question is if there is a morally relevant difference in 
terms of how people are harmed. Nardin argues that there is no such 
difference. The duty to protect should not discriminate between “harm from 
any cause, human or natural”, “violent” or “non-violent” for it is the harm 
itself that is important, rather than its type.55 The connection to international 
distributive justice is then made by conceiving of poverty, starvation, suffering 
from diseases as harm that is solvable by a redistribution of resources 
globally.56However, Nardin stops short at translating the duty to protect into 
principles of international distributive justice. His argument merely implies 
the obligation to remedy harm and not, for example, the scope of such duties. 
 
The second account belongs to Laura Valentini, who wishes to resolve the 
stalemate between statists and cosmopolitans in the international distributive 
justice literature.57 While Valentini provides thought-provoking foundations 
for thinking about both just war theory and international distributive justice, 
she stops short of using these foundations to construct an international 
distributive justice theory. Let me begin by examining the object of 
Valentini’s criticism. According to Valentini, both the statist and cosmopolitan 
camps capture only a partial picture, for the world is populated by “neither 
denizens of independent islands” (as the statists would have it) “nor citizens of 
a global polity” (as cosmopolitans would have it).58 Rather, the world contains 
both these aspects in the form of a “nested islands model”, where political 
                                                
54 Ibid., 458. 
55 Ibid., 461. 
56 Ibid., 462. 
57 Laura Valentini, Justice in a Globalised World: A Normative Framework. (Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 2. 
58 Ibid., 186. 
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communities are connected via a “dense and intricate network of bridges” that 
partially relate the outside to within, and vice versa.59 Her solution is to 
conceive of global justice as forbidding two forms of coercion, so as to 
capture these two dynamics. The first, interactional coercion, evaluates 
interactions between states and addresses the statist literature.  It can be 
defined as the situation where one agent “foreseeably and avoidably places 
non-trivial constraints” on another’s freedom. 60  The second, systemic 
coercion, evaluates global socio-economic interactions in terms of how they 
are facilitated by systems of rules and addresses the cosmopolitan literature. A 
system of rules becomes coercive if it “foreseeably and avoidably places non-
trivial constraints on some agents’ freedom.”61 Valentini concludes by noting 
that the magnitude of one’s responsibility’s “depend(s) on the particular 
position one occupies” (be it within the state or the system) and the degree to 
which one has contributed to coercion of either kind. 62  How such a 
responsibility translates into duties of international distributive justice, 
however, remains unanswered. 
 
Having briefly covered the literature that covers the intersection between just 
war theory and international distributive justice, I now outline the approach 
that I adopt in this thesis. I will mainly (though not exclusively) take Michael 
Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars as the basis from which I draw insights about 
just war theory. My rationale for using a specific author is to have as few 
moving parts as possible. One criticism of this approach is that I would fail to 
                                                
59 Ibid., 186.   
60 Ibid., 130. 
61 Ibid., 137. 
62 Ibid., 150-152. 
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capture nuances in the field of just war theory, for there are multiple issues in 
the literature that remain in dispute. One example would be the emergence of 
new military technologies such as the use of drones, nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons. The increasing prominence of these new weapons has 
raised questions as to whether the traditional jus in bello (just conduct in war) 
prescriptions of proportionality and non-combatant immunity still apply.63 
Another issue is if jus as bellum (just causes for war) and jus in bello should 
remain logically distinct and independent as per mainstream characterisation.64 
Jeff McMahan is a strong proponent of the contrary view for he sees soldiers 
as being responsible and by implication, blameworthy, for their involvement 
in unjust wars. 65 In response to this criticism, I acknowledge that the just war 
literature is complex but argue that it is difficult to build a theory of 
international distributive theory on a certain foundation (just war theory) while 
simultaneously questioning this foundation.66 These are different projects that 
are best pursued separately.  
 
                                                
63 Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons are covered in Steven, P. Lee,. Weapons of Mass 
Destruction: Are They Morally Special? In War: Essays in Political Philosophy, edited by 
Larry May, 165-186. (Cambridge University Press, 2008). Drones are discussed in Mary-Kate 
Leahy, “Keeping Up with the Drones: Is Just War Theory Obsolete?” Unpublished Program 
Research Project. (United States Army War College, 2010). 
64 Fritz Allholff, Nicholas. G. Evans & Adam Henschke, “Introduction: Not just wars: 
expansions and alternatives to the just war tradition” in Routledge Handbook of Ethics and 
War: Just War Theory in the twenty-first century, edited by Fritz Allhoff, Nicholas. G. Evans 
& Adam Henschke, 1-8. (Routledge: New York and London, 2013), 1.  
Allholf, F., Evans, N. G. & Henschke, A. (2013) Introduction: Not just wars: expansions and 
alternatives to the just war tradition. In F. Allhoff, N. G. Evans & A. Henschke. (Eds) 
Routledge Handbook of Ethics and War: Just War Theory in the twenty-first century. 
Routledge: New York and London. 1. 
65 Jeff McMahan, “Can soldiers be expected to know whether their war is just?” in Routledge 
Handbook of Ethics and War: Just War Theory in the twenty-first century, edited by Fritz 
Allhoff, Nicholas. G. Evans & Adam Henschke, 13-22. (Routledge: New York and London, 
2013), 13. 
66 Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct. (Oxford University Press, 1975), 25. 
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I have two further clarifications in relation to the approach I adopt in this 
thesis. First, with regards to my choice of just war theory, I choose Walzer’s 
theory in Just and Unjust Wars for he stands as the most prominent theorist in 
contemporary times.67 I recognise that other scholars may prefer to choose 
another just war theorist of their own. This difference does not dispute my 
larger goal of using just war theory to think about international distributive 
justice more generally. Second, the fact that I choose to reference mainly Just 
and Unjust Wars does not entail a completely uncritical acceptance of 
Walzer’s writings, only that it is not my primary objective to evaluate his 
work. It is necessary for me to mitigate some of the weaknesses that I see in 
Walzer’s theory so as to provide a stronger foundation for building a theory of 
international distributive justice. To elaborate on my position further, I am 
primarily concerned with interpreting Walzer’s work and not defending his 
work from his critics per se. However, I also find it useful to draw upon other 
theories so as to better explain why Walzer chooses to craft his just war theory 
the way he does. My interpretation would be less persuasive without these 
other alternatives as a basis for comparison. Thus, I do not restrict myself 
solely to referencing Walzer’s work in the course of this thesis.  
 
Another objection to my just war approach (in general) and Walzer as a just 
war theorist (in particular) could be its implicit bias towards statism. Walzer’s 
just war theory is commonly seen as prioritising the rights of states over the 
                                                
67 Peter Sutch, “International Justice and Reform of Global Governance: A Reconsideration of 




rights of individuals.68 Cosmopolitans, or those who would conceptualise “of 
the world at large as a unified polis”, would object on the grounds that a 
theory of international distributive justice borne out of just war theory would 
likewise concede “normative primacy to state sovereignty.”69 There are two 
ways in which I would counter such an objection. First, I argue that this 
accusation stems from a misreading of Walzer’s theory of aggression, where 
the first and second proposition states that “There exists an international 
society of independent states… (and) this international society has a law that 
establishes the rights of its members – above all, the rights of territorial 
integrity and political sovereignty.”70 However, one should also note that 
Walzer perceives states “neither (as) organic wholes nor mystical unions.”71 
What this means is that states are not intrinsically valuable for Walzer. Rather, 
a more careful reading of Walzer reveals that states are instrumentally 
valuable for carving out a protected space in which men and women can share 
and decide their common way of life.72 In other words, Walzer’s just war 
theory not only accounts for but also prioritises individuals’ right to life and 
liberty, for these rights form the basis for state sovereignty in the first place.73 
Returning to the objection outlined earlier, my reading of Walzer should 
explain how his just war theory is not necessarily statist.  Second, I argue that 
this accusation (that a theory of international distributive justice borne out of 
just war theory would be inherently state centric) stems from a 
                                                
68 Laura Valentini, Justice in a Globalised World: A Normative Framework. (Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 23. 
69 Anthony, J. Coates, International Justice and Just War Theory. In International Justice, 
edited by Anthony J. Coates, (Ashgate Publishing Company, 2000), 49. 51. 
70 Michael Walzer,. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. 
(Basic Books 1977, 4th Edition, 2006), 61. 
71 Ibid., 53. 
72 Ibid., 53-54. 
73 Ibid., 54. 
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misunderstanding of my approach more generally. Using just war theory as an 
approach does not mean blindly translating all its qualities to the context of 
international distributive justice. Rather, a fruitful and careful study of just war 
theory would entail understanding the rationale(s) behind the theory and 
whether similar rationale(s) apply to international distributive justice as well. 
 
Having addressed the chief objection to my chosen approach, I now provide a 
brief overview of the chapters ahead. Chapter One explores the foundation of 
just causes for war where I argue that communal autonomy forms the 
underlying thread that connects the various causes together. Chapter Two 
relates communal autonomy to international distributive justice by arguing 
that distributive principles should rely on relations as their foundation. If the 
universe cannot be plausibly considered a community yet, the implication, 
then, is that international distributive justice principles should be minimalist in 
substance. Chapter Three investigates the negative, positive and limits to duty 
that combatants owe to non-combatants. I argue that it is our right to life that 
informs the type and extent of the combatants’ duties. In Chapter Four, I 
translate the right to life (in the just war context) to the right to subsistence (in 
the international distributive context) and illustrate how it likewise informs 
our duties to aid the global poor. Finally, I conclude by relating the 








Jus Ad Bellum & Communal Autonomy 
In this chapter, I investigate Walzer’s just causes (defence against aggression, 
secession, counter-intervention and humanitarian intervention) and ask what 
thread connects them.74 The goal here is to consider why Walzer cites these 
and not others as legitimate causes for war. My argument is that a right to 
communal autonomy undergirds Walzer’s thinking for listing these four 
causes as just.75 More specifically, I aim to elucidate what Walzer means 
when he says that states should “always act so as to recognise and uphold 
communal autonomy” in relation to his just causes for war.76 Next, I go 
beyond this claim to investigate why there should be a right to communal 
autonomy in the first place. Because Walzer does not explicitly defend this 
right in Just and Unjust Wars, it is better explicated by referring to his other 
works. 
 
1.1) Uncovering communal autonomy in just war theory: 
In Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer starts with a premise that individuals have a 
right to life and liberty.77 These two basic rights eventually translate into an 
argument for communal autonomy. Walzer is explicit about not providing a 
foundation for such rights and is satisfied to note that “it is enough to say that 
they are somehow entailed by our sense of what it means to be a human 
being.” 78  Walzer acknowledges natural law and convention as possible 
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sources upon which such rights could be based but he remains agnostic about 
them. His indifference here is in line with the position outlined in his preface, 
where he states that “I am not going to expound morality from the ground up. 
Were I to begin with the foundations, I would probably never get beyond 
them; I am by no means sure what the foundations are.”79 He even goes to the 
extent of specifying his audience as those who already share his convictions, 
that of those who “understood (his) condemnation” of the Vietnam War, in 
order to speak in the language of their (our) common morality.80 
 
The absence of foundations has caused Walzer to come under fire from other 
scholars. Hedley Bull, for example, argues that “(t)his disdain of foundations 
is the cardinal – and, it appears to me, the most vulnerable – feature of 
Walzer’s position”.81 Bull makes his case by noting that Walzer makes several 
decisions (one of which is the basis of human rights) without fully explicating 
the moral foundations involved.82 The implication of this move is that there is 
no clear reason as to “why we should listen to him rather than to someone 
whose outlook is fundamentally different”. 83  Nicholas Rengger makes a 
similar observation when he points out that Walzer “deploys a rather 
convoluted rights theory to ground what he calls the ‘war convention’.”84 
Unlike Bull however, Rengger views this matter as one of little consequence, 
for “(a) tradition of thinking can have many roots, be fed by many 
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tributaries… one has to understand a tradition as part of an ongoing and 
potentially never-ending conversation in which many different assumptions 
will take centre stage at various points.”85 One way to frame what this section 
is about is to see it as striking a middle ground between Bull’s and Rengger’s 
positions. On the one hand, I am not fleshing out the metaphysical foundations 
to Walzer’s just war theory when he himself does not provide them. On the 
other hand, I do attempt to outline the rationale involved in his thought 
process, for I find it important in terms of transferring the just war framework 
over to international distributive justice. 
 
The next step that Walzer takes is to connect the rights of individuals to the 
rights of states.  Walzer relates the latter as being the “collective form” of the 
former.86 Two strands of thought inform his ideas here. The first borrows from 
social contract theory, where the term “contract” is not literal but 
metaphorical.87 What this means is that citizens need not explicitly transfer 
their individual rights to their state. Rather, a state has rights so long as it 
protects and makes possible not only individual life and liberty, but also the 
“common life” its citizens have built.88 Autonomy and political sovereignty 
are the key words here, for what a state stands guard over is the right to decide 
upon a collective way of life. The second thread has to do with the physical 
space in which such rights are enacted.89 Communal life does not just exist in 
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the abstract, there also has to be a site in which such practices can and do take 
place. Hence, there is a need for territorial integrity. 
 
Although he does not always express this sentiment explicitly, I argue that the 
various causes Walzer considers to be just all relate to a right to choose one’s 
way of life, both as an individual and as part of a collective.90 The most 
straightforward case has to do with his theory of aggression, where self-
defence is justified as responding to unwarranted external intervention. 
According to Walzer, aggression is severe to the extent of being “the only 
crime that states can commit against other states: everything else is, as it were, 
a misdemeanor.”91 What Walzer means by this statement is that unlike crime 
in the domestic context, aggressive acts in the international context cannot be 
differentiated with regards to the response they demand. 92 To elaborate, 
domestic crimes can be broken down into different types ranging from 
pickpocketing, robbery, blackmail, assault, murder and so on. 93 The different 
severity of such crimes then justifies a variety of responses, with murder 
justifying a more serious response than pickpocketing for example. There are 
also different types of aggressive acts in the international arena, which range 
from land seizure, imposing a satellite regime to the destruction of lives and 
property in foreign territory.94 However, the response that all these aggressive 
acts justify is the same, that of “forceful resistance”. 95 Forceful resistance 
entails placing lives on the line in order to defend one’s right to a particular 
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way of life. Unlike conflicts between individuals, clashes between states 
nearly always entail the loss of lives.96 How external aggressors threaten the 
right to communal autonomy, then, is by forcing people to choose between 
taking up arms (risking their lives) or forsaking their ability to decide their 
own socio-political affairs (risking their liberty).97 In either of these cases, 
individuals and communities are denied at least one of the two rights that 
Walzer thinks are basic to being human. In sum, self-defence becomes 
justifiable because “(a)ggression … in all its forms, it challenges rights that 
are worth dying for.”98 
 
The second just cause for war that Walzer identifies has to do secession.99 I 
will begin by explaining why Walzer argues that external intervention is not 
justified when it comes to self-determination generally before I explain why 
he allows secession as an exception. When dealing with the question of “self-
determination and self-help”, Walzer follows John Stuart Mill in arguing that 
“citizens…of a single political community (are) entitled collectively to 
determine their own affairs.” 100 However, self-determination must be earned 
and not simply given by some external party to members in the political 
community. 101 The logic of Mill’s argument can be explained by an analogy 
between an individual person and a political community. Just as an individual 
cannot be compelled towards goodness, the various members of a political 
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community “must seek their own freedom”.102 The only way we can tell 
whether a community is ready to rule itself is when its members are able to 
organize themselves in a way that allows them to prevail in their domestic 
political arena.103 In cases of domestic tyranny, then, the appropriate treatment 
is for the local resistance movements to remove the tyrant without outside 
assistance. It is only through a struggle, through “brav(ing) labour and danger 
for their liberation”, that people gain the necessary political capacities to 
govern themselves with.104 External interventions are not justified in this 
context for they expedite the liberation process at the risk of granting political 
independence to people who are not yet ready to handle the responsibilities 
that comes with independence.  
 
What justifies secessions as an exception to such a rule? The difference with 
secession is that the agents involved have proven its credibility that there is 
indeed “a distinct community” and that this political community is able to 
handle the communal autonomy that it is fighting for. 105 Although Walzer 
does not provide an explicit guideline for when an independence movement 
has enough gravity to count as secession, he does provide a principle for 
differentiating the two: the latter should have sustained a struggle to the 
degree that they demonstrate the capacity (or at least the potential) for self-
rule. 106 The capacity for self-rule is then demonstrated through acts such as 
mobilising a significant portion of the population towards their cause or 
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initiating a movement against the current regime.107 Finally, aside from the 
case of secession, Walzer also remarks that  “military action (that aid 
independence movements) against imperial or colonial repression” is 
justifiable.108 In this case, I argue that Walzer sees independence movements 
against imperial rule as an exception because unnatural external interventions 
(such as conquests) gave rise to these independence movements in the first 
place. Subsequent foreign interventions are more properly thought of as 
counter-interventions (albeit in a delayed fashion) that are justified because 
they aim to restore the original condition of communal autonomy.109  
 
The third just cause for war is to resist an unjustified intervention through a 
counter-intervention, with the latter being justified on the basis of restoring the 
original dynamics of the community. Counter-intervention can be understood 
as permissible in situations where “(a)s soon as one outside power violates the 
norms of neutrality and nonintervention … the way is open for other powers to 
do so.”110  In other words, if the power dynamics of internal political strife are 
distorted due to external assistance, other foreign actors are allowed and even 
encouraged to intervene so as to restore the balance.111 The logic of Walzer’s 
reasoning in this case is more easily understood through the story he tells 
about a policeman who prevents outsiders from intervening when two people 
are fighting.112 Should the policeman fail to do that, he should aid the 
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disadvantaged fighter to the extent that the other fighter has been 
advantaged.113 In my understanding, the point that Walzer is trying to make 
with this story is that there should be a fair fight between the two (or more) 
parties at the local level.   
 
However, there are also several just war scholars who argue that Walzer’s 
concept of balance is problematic. In my view, criticisms of Walzer’s account 
of counter-intervention can be addressed by reformulating Walzer’s account in 
a more precise fashion I will then relate this reformulated account to the 
concept of communal autonomy. The criticisms towards the concept of 
balance can be categorised into two main types. The first type of criticism 
questions the practicality of such a proposal. Brian Orend, for example, argues 
that it is extremely difficult to tell if the assistance provided is proportionate 
(or not) for the calculations here involve “balance of probabilities” rather than 
concrete figures per se.114 First, it is by no means clear how an army should 
operationalise the concept of balance. For example, should an army measure 
its input (for instance, each side using 10 fighter planes), its output (for 
example, each side killing 70 combatants) or some other indicator to judge 
when it has restored balance or not? Second, even if we could agree upon 
metrics involved, it is not realistic to expect armies to gather such fine grained 
information during war. The second type of criticism questions the value of 
preserving balance in a local struggle. To elaborate, Gerald Doppelt attributes 
balance of various factions in a local struggle to features such as “military 
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skill, experience, ruthlessness, or equipment”. 115 Doppelt’s point is that it is 
unclear what exactly is morally valuable about the features listed above.   
 
In response to the above criticisms, I would reformulate Walzer’s argument 
for counter-intervention as being justified on the basis of resisting an unjust 
external interference, thereby restoring communal autonomy.  A better reading 
of Walzer’s account of counter-intervention is to understand that the point is 
not so much restoring balance per se as elimination of unwarranted outside 
influences. Walzer himself alludes to this point when he notes first and 
foremost that the policeman “should stop anyone else from interfering”, 
whereas “proportionate assistance” (or balancing) serves as a back-up option. 
116 He merely does not emphasise this point to the extent that I do. A more 
fitting metaphor for counter-intervention, then, is that of a referee in a boxing 
match who ensures a fair fight by ensuring that unwarranted influences (such 
as when supporters for one fighter enter the boxing ring to help him) are 
removed from the boxing ring appropriately. The boxing ring, in this case, 
serves as a symbolic expression of a protected space in which local actors 
compete for political power. Communal autonomy serves as the basis from 
which this reformulated account of counter-intervention draws its moral force, 
for it is only members who belong to the protected space that should (and 
ideally do) influence the outcome of the political struggle.  
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The final just cause for war is humanitarian intervention. I begin by explaining 
what Walzer means by the term “humanitarian intervention” for he has in 
mind high standards that may not be shared by other scholars.117 According to 
Walzer, humanitarian intervention is only justified when there are “acts “that 
shock the moral conscience of mankind.””118 What Walzer means to express 
with such a sentiment is that there must be a severe human rights violation in 
order to justify interventions and not just any human rights violation would do. 
More specifically, when we examine his chosen case studies of Cuba in 1898 
and Bangladesh in 1971, we see that the standard Walzer has in mind runs 
along the lines of forced resettlement (with little regard for health of the 
affected Cuban population) or mass killings (in relation to Bangladeshi’s 
“political, cultural, and intellectual” elite).119  
 
Next, how does this discussion of humanitarian intervention connect to the 
rationale of communal autonomy? I argue that humanitarian intervention is 
justified because it seeks to secure the “bare survival” of the members in a 
political community, without which we cannot speak of communal autonomy 
at all.120 For Walzer, the severity of the human rights violation matters 
because human intervention is justified on the basis of restoring the people’s 
capacity to make their own decisions. To intervene on the basis of a lower 
standard of human rights violations (such as the right to free press for 
example) is to undermine the autonomy of others by being “violently 
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paternalistic”.121Another way to frame the justification of human intervention 
is to see it as resistance against internal aggression. To elaborate, 
governments who commit mass atrocities deny their own people their right to 
lead a life of their own choosing (or a life at all) through systematic slaughter. 
122 However, unlike the typical case of external aggression, the source of 
human right violations comes from within the state’s boundaries. Although I 
acknowledge that the actors are different (one’s own government versus an 
enemy state), I contend that the objection to their actions remains similar, 
which is that an individual’s legitimate right to life and liberty is under threat.  
In other words, the same goal of defending one’s rights, both on the individual 
and collective level, applies in the case of humanitarian intervention as well.  
 
1.2) Reasons for communal autonomy: 
Having established that a right to communal autonomy forms the basis of 
Walzer’s discussion of just causes, it is worth asking why Walzer places such 
a premium on having the right to decide upon a communal life. The exact 
motivations behind this argument are best found not in Just and Unjust War 
itself, but in several of Walzer’s other writings, in particular Interpretation 
and Social Criticism, Thick and Thin, and Spheres of Justice. Let me begin by 
explaining the concept of communal autonomy in greater depth. Communal 
autonomy provides communities with the ability to interpret and amend their 
own particular moral traditions and practices. Such an argument does not 
assume there is (or should be) a single universal corrective to the various 
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moral codes of the world. To be clear, I am not saying that Walzer is taking a 
conservative stance and arguing that the world as it is reflects the world that 
should be. Rather, Walzer’s argument privileges the role of an insider and 
leaves it (largely) up to them to decide whether the community’s state of 
affairs is satisfactory (or not). One way that Walzer frames his argument is 
through his defence of interpretivism as the method in moral philosophy that 
“accords best with our everyday experience of morality”.123 The interpretive 
method works by relying upon pre-existing moral traditions of various 
political communities as a basis for understanding and evaluating current 
practices. Walzer makes his case by establishing the following two points. 
 
Human flourishing: 
First, Walzer argues that humans flourish best in a setting of dense moral 
meanings, rather than in the context of abstracted universal principles that 
merely provide a minimum standard. Let me begin by first explaining the 
difference between the two. Following Walzer, I will use the expression “thick 
morality” to describe the particularistic and lived experiences of most people, 
whereas “thin morality” describes the universalistic, abstract principles of 
morality. One example of thick morality is the American ideal of “(s)ocial 
democracy, market freedom, moral laissez-faire, republican virtue, this or that 
idea of public decency or the good life.”124 In contrast, something closer to 
thin morality would be “largely negative” in nature, where there are 
“prohibitions against ‘the grossest injustices’, like ‘murder, deception, 
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betrayal, gross cruelty’, ‘radical coercion’, ‘brutal repression’ and ‘torture, 
oppression and tyranny’.”125 The rationale behind thin morality is that nearly 
any reasonable person would require physical security and “freedom from 
domination” in order to achieve his or her ends, whatever they are. 126 Thus, I 
would frame thin morality as a necessary but insufficient condition in terms of 
human flourishing.127 
  
How, then, does thick morality facilitate human flourishing? Let me begin by 
examining the analogy that Walzer uses to connect these two features. Walzer 
contrasts a home (thick morality) with a hotel (thin morality). According to 
Walzer, the mistake that philosophers make is to assume that people would 
prefer to live in hotels rather than the homes that they already own. Walzer 
references Rawls’ veil of ignorance when he notes that people, when 
“deprived of all knowledge of what our own home was like, talking with 
people similarly deprived, required to design rooms that any one of us might 
live in, we would probably come up with something like, but not quite so 
culturally specific as, the Hilton Hotel.”128 Even though Walzer grants Rawls 
the point that people could come to a consensus and agree on what a 
convenient shelter could look like (such as Rawls’ principles of justice), he 
argues that adopting such principles does not necessarily follow from creating 
them. Going back to the analogy, Walzer observes that, “we might still long 
for the homes we once knew but could no longer remember. We would not be 
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morally bound to live in the hotel we had designed.”129 While a home offers 
(but a hotel does not) is the comfort of familiarity and a deep “sense of 
belonging”.130 Translating these sentiments into the context of morality, then, 
we find that Walzer advocates for existing moral traditions for being 
recognisable and rich sources of authority from which we can draw upon to 
make our own moral judgments. 
 
One objection to Walzer’s proposal concerns those who are metaphorically 
“homeless”, such as “exile(s), outcast(s), refugee(s) or stateless (peoples)”.131 
For the sake of simplicity, I will characterise those all who are metaphorically 
homeless under the term “stateless people”. Walzer’s proposal that each 
political community should be given the autonomy to decide its own affairs 
runs the risk of leaving these stateless people vulnerable to immoral treatment 
because they do not fall under the jurisdiction of any state. In other words, if 
people have no political affiliation, it appears as if no morality applies to them. 
Moral minimalism or thin morality enters the picture as a solution here, for it 
ensures a minimum standard of human decency towards those without 
political affiliation. Substantively, one could imagine the following elements 
as constituting thin morality: “basic prohibitions of murder, deceptions, 
betrayal (and) gross cruelty”. 132  But even as Walzer acknowledges the 
importance of such a baseline, he warns us not to confuse bare necessities with 
desire, for those who lack political affiliation “need a universal (if minimum) 
morality, or at least a morality worked out among strangers” but want a 
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morality that is far more substantial than the thin version. 133 Walzer continues 
with his accommodation analogy by noting that what people eventually want 
is “not to be permanently registered in a hotel but to be established in a new 
home”. 134 
 
Where, then, does such a minimum standard come from? Contrary to 
(philosophical) intuition, Walzer posits that the relationship between thick and 
thin morality is not that we start from a thin conception of morality that 
thickens over time.135 Rather, a minimal standard is abstracted from the thick 
morality that surrounds us. It is universal in a reiterative sense because it 
emerges when most, if not all, thick moralities converge upon a common 
baseline.136 In relation to human flourishing, then, one could see communal 
autonomy as not only being inherently desirable (for it facilitates thick 
morality), but also instrumentally useful (for the purposes of constructing a 
global minimum).  
 
Criticism from within: 
Critics of Walzer’s position have argued that even if communal autonomy 
facilitates human flourishing, it is often difficult (if not impossible) for change 
to come from within a community.137 In response, I will elaborate on Walzer’s 
                                                
133 Ibid., 16. Emphasis original. 
134 Ibid.,16. Emphasis original. 
135 Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad. (University of 
Notre  Press, 1994), 4.  
136 The term “reiterative” is used by Walzer in Michael Walzer, “Nation and Universe” in 
Thinking Politically: Essays in Political Theory, edited by David Miller. (Yale University 
Press, 2007), 187. The explanation I provide is drawn from Peter Sutch,“International Justice 
and Reform of Global Governance: A Reconsideration of Michael Walzer’s  International 
Political Theory”, Review of International Studies 35, No. 3 (2009): 520.  
137 Brian Orend, Michael Walzer on War and Justice. (McGill-Queen’s University Press: 
Montreal & Kingston & London & Ithaca, 2000), 7.   
33 
 
position by interpreting how it is both possible and preferable to criticize from 
within, rather than from beyond the community. Let us first examine the 
critics’ position. First, if it is not possible for change to come from within, 
external intervention is necessary for moral progress. The important 
conceptual distinction is between “step(ping) back from society” and 
“step(ping) away from certain sorts of power relationships in society.”138 The 
prerequisite for critical distance is only the latter and not the former. In other 
words, the critic need not be detached from the norms and practices of society 
absolutely. Rather, critical distance is achieved by carefully probing the 
justifications for power relations and holding political authorities accountable 
to their promises. One example that Walzer uses to illustrate this point is that 
of the hierarchy in medieval Europe, with its “gentlemen, lords and barons”, 
which eventually collapsed due to internal pressures.139 The justification of 
hierarchy was that the upper classes were supposed to serve the lower classes, 
to have “the strong defending the weak” so as to speak.140 This “founding 
myth” fell apart when practice diverged from rhetoric on too frequent a 
basis.141 What started out as accusations of hypocrisy (as the aristocrats did 
not live up to expectations) eventually turned into deep skepticism, leading to 
a refutation of the practice itself.142 The example suggests that criticism can 
come from within, by “exposing… internal tensions and contradictions” in 
order to enact change.143 
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Rather than consider it impossible for change to come from within, the second 
challenge to community autonomy is the view that external intervention is 
preferable to internal critique. There are various reasons as to why one could 
hold such a view. These reasons range from a belief that divine revelation 
(such as the ten commandments being inscribed on stone tablets) would offer 
greater wisdom than what any mortal mind could or that intellectual elites 
from other communities would be able to offer a fresh perspective on the 
practices that a community takes for granted.144 Regardless of the reasons 
involved, Walzer makes the point that external intervention is not ideal. The 
analogy that Walzer draws here is that of a missionary attempting to “offer a 
persuasive account of a new moral or physical world” to ignorant or willful 
natives.145 The attempt is unlikely to succeed because such an account would 
be “incomprehensible” to its target audience, especially so in the earlier 
stages.146  One can infer from Walzer’s work that there are, at this point, two 
choices open to the missionary (and newcomers in general). The first option is 
that of waiting till such “ideas have been naturalized in their new setting, 
woven into the fabric of the already existing culture,” such that they can be put 
into practice.147 However, as the term “naturalization” suggests, the criticisms 
have been converted from an outside force to an inside one, turning it into 
internal critique. For those who have less patience, the second option entails 
“manipulation or coercion” of the natives into believing the new morality 
prematurely. Walzer’s point is not merely theoretical. This tendency towards 
violence manifested itself in the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, where 
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peasants were forced to undergo “an enforced awakening”, supposedly for 
their own good.148 This vision of politics is dangerous because it justifies 
immoral means to replace one morality with another, even in the best case 
scenario where we assume that the newcomer’s morality is the one which 
should rightfully prevail.149 The preference for criticising from within, then, 
can be seen as one way to guard against such violence. 
 
1.3) Conclusion: 
To sum up this chapter, I have made a case that communal autonomy 
underlies Walzer’s four just causes for war (defence against aggression, 
secession, counter-intervention and humanitarian intervention). I have also 
investigated Walzer’s other works to better understand why he places such a 
high premium on communal autonomy, arguing that communal autonomy is 
valuable for human flourishing. How would the concept of communal 
autonomy translate into the international distributive justice context? It is to 
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Communal Autonomy & International Distributive Justice 
My goal in this chapter is to explore the relationship between communal 
autonomy and principles of international distributive justice. Previously, I 
argued that communal autonomy can be understood in terms of being “a 
protected space” where members of a political community can decide for 
themselves how to run their own affairs.150 In the context of just war theory, 
the word “space” is literal in that it represents the territorial area in which a 
nation resides. This territory is defined by political boundaries and these 
boundaries are enforced by state protection. Unjustified boundary crossings by 
foreign actors are then seen as a threat to these protected spaces and are (or 
ideally, should be) met with “forceful resistance”.151 One analogy that vividly 
illustrates this logic is that of an armed robber (aggressor) breaking into 
someone’s home (a protected space). 152 The violation of a sacred space 
suffices to constitute a wrongdoing, even if the robber does not take any 
possessions away in the process. Having provided a brief sketch of what 
communal autonomy means in the context of just war, I now attempt to relate 
this concept to international distributive justice. I propose that we rely upon 
the same definition of communal autonomy, where we understand the term to 
mean that members of a community can come together to collectively decide 
upon their way of life. I intend to flesh out the concept of communal 
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autonomy by breaking the term down into two parts, community and the 
autonomy that a community possesses, and analyse each in turn. 
 
2.1) Community: 
In considering the concept of community, I want to briefly address why the 
concept matters for international distributive justice before discussing what it 
means. The term community connects to the conversation about the 
foundations for international distributive justice, where the two schools of 
thought, relationists and non-relationists, compete against each other. 
Relationists argue that duties of distributive justice only arise when people are 
related to each other in some relevant fashion.153 Non-relationists prefer to 
take the intrinsic moral worth of human beings as the basis for distributive 
justice instead.154 The principle of communal autonomy, when abstracted from 
just war theory and applied to international distributive justice, leads me to 
favour a relational approach to the subject matter. The strength of such a 
position is that it better explains our more nuanced response to people whose 
practices diverge from our own and yet can be acknowledged as legitimate in 
one way or another. 155   
 
What constitutes a community? 
In this section, I assess two possible candidates for a community: the universe 
and the nation-state and argue that the latter is comes closer to our 
understanding of a community. The implication of such an argument is that 
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the scope for principles of distributive justice should largely be national, rather 
than global.  
 
Universe as community: 
I argue that the universe cannot be seen as a community yet for there is a weak 
sense of common identity, mixed evidence for a shared fate and different 
societies currently do not share the same set of social meanings for objects of 
distribution.156 
 
First, why does a common identity matter for international distributive justice? 
A common identity matters because it is this sense of solidarity and trust that 
enables people to pursue their common interest at the cost of considerable 
self-sacrifice.157  Sources for a common identity are varied and complex, 
ranging from factors such as a shared past, culture, belief or language. These 
factors do, however, serve the same purpose by providing the social glue 
necessary for people to willingly give up some of their surpluses to the 
disadvantaged within their community. 158 Next, what does it look like to have 
a common identity on a global scale? The features of a common global 
identity could include shared norms and values (as opposed to language or 
culture) as a basis for commonality.159 Decisions made and actions taken by 
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actors in the international realm should also reflect concerns for the global 
good rather than that of national interest. 160 Having outlined the features of a 
common identity, I further observe that there is little evidence for seeing 
humanity as a global community, for the similarity of us being fellow humans 
is often overridden by other identity markers, such as our nationality, religion, 
gender and sexuality.  
 
Second, I argue that evidence for there being a shared fate for humanity at 
large is inconclusive at best. A shared fate matters for international 
distributive justice because it is fitting for a group to collectively enjoy (or 
suffer) the consequences that follow from the decisions that they have made 
for themselves. Decisions take place on two different levels here: that of the 
goals they find most relevant to them and the means they find most suitable to 
reach those goals.161 The question of distribution emerges when there are 
burdens or surpluses that arise from the goals and means chosen. As 
mentioned earlier, I argue that evidence for a shared fate is at best mixed on a 
global level. On the one hand, different political communities do not share a 
similar fate for domestic factors such as the quality of institutions makes a 
difference in terms of how well each country does.162 It is also this factor that 
primarily explains why countries that were at a similar stage of development 
at the same point in time could end up with vastly different fortunes decades 
later. On the other hand, we could argue that different people around the world 
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share a similar fate when it comes to climate change. First, climate change 
affects everyone around the world rather than just selected populations.163 
Second, climate change entails effects that will endure for generations to 
come, therefore facilitating not just a momentary convergence of interests, but 
being bound by the same plight on a long term basis.164 Thus, I would 
conclude that there is mixed evidence in terms of there being a shared fate for 
people around the world. 
 
Third, I argue that different societies around the world do not yet share a 
similar set of social meanings for objects of distribution. For example, the 
religious differences between different communities, such as how alcohol is 
permitted in certain faiths and not in others, could lead to divergent 
assessments on the absolute value of arable land in a country, such as those 
suitable for the cultivation of grapes for example.165 These shared meanings 
matter because objects of distribution are not value neutral; their meanings and 
value vary in accordance to different contexts.166 Even for an item as basic as 
bread, one could imagine it being interpreted as sustenance in one context and 
a religious offering (“the body of Christ”), in another.167 It is difficult, if not 
impossible, to come up with a theory of international distributive justice 
without at least some convergence in terms of the meanings of the objects 
involved.  
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In response, critics could argue that there is no need for perfect convergence 
when it comes to shared meanings for objects of distribution. Consensus about 
primary goods would suffice for distributive purposes.168 Primary goods can 
defined as being goods that would help most rational people accomplish their 
ends, regardless of what those ends are.169 A plausible set of primary goods 
could then include items such as access to food, water, housing, education, 
medical care and transport. I accept this response but contend that two further 
problems remain for advocates of cosmopolitan approaches. First, even if we 
could come to a consensus about what primary goods across most societies 
looks like, there could very well be different prioritisation of various primary 
goods depending on the society involved. Second, when we move from 
primary goods to more complex goods, such as power, we experience even 
greater interpretive differences.170 Both these issues make it difficult for goods 
to be distributed meaningfully on a global scale. 
 
Nation-states as community: 
In this section, I argue that the nation-state is the most convincing unit when it 
comes to thinking about community. Following David Miller, I define a nation 
as “a community (1) constituted by a shared belief and mutual commitment, 
(2) extended in history, (3) active in character, (4) connected to a particular 
territory, and (5) marked off from other communities by its distinct public 
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culture.” 171  The first characteristic is most important, for the sense of 
belonging to the same political community is the defining feature of 
nationhood.172 No objective feature (such as having a common language) is 
necessary for nationhood, for different nations have different elements as its 
social glue and it is the subjective belief of having commonalities (regardless 
of the validity of such sentiments) that matter.173 As for states, the two features 
that are vital are that of territorial integrity and political sovereignty.  
 
First, do members of a nation-state share a common identity? For proponents 
of this view, their main observation is that we are “not cosmopolitans, if by 
‘cosmopolitan’ we mean that we are willing to prioritise equally the needs of 
those near us and those far from us.”174 Rather, we discriminate between 
different forms of association and often are more willing to help a co-national 
before aiding a stranger elsewhere. When successful (such as the case of 
modern welfare states), national ties capture the moral imagination of its 
members and allow for redistributive policies, for this special relationship 
provides the motivation needed for redistribution.175 As noted previously, it is 
hard for similar projects to take flight on a global scale without communal 
bonds across humanity as an anchor. 
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The main difficulty that confronts this view is that nations do not always 
cohere nicely with states, for there are people who are placed (sometimes 
arbitrarily) under the rule of those with whom they share no affiliation.176 In 
other words, there is no or little basis for a common national identity across 
citizens, just as different peoples around the world do not embody a common 
global identity. What the citizens do share is being under a similar system of 
political coercion and economic cooperation, although these by themselves are 
insufficient to generate the solidarity required for redistribution. In happier 
circumstances, the nation in question is allowed to form its own state, such as 
when New Zealand declined to join the other colonies in forming the 
Commonwealth of Australia.177 What is more typical however, is the violence 
with which Pakistan broke away from India.178 Given such a backdrop, critics 
assert that peoples who do not identify with the government to which they are 
subjected are under no obligation to redistribute to those who happen to share 
the same borders. This matter can best be settled by framing it as a question of 
degree. On one end of the spectrum, people within a nation-state can be too 
splintered to share a common identity; on the other end, relatively small and 
homogeneous societies (such as the Scandinavian democracies) embody the 
common identity argument persuasively. The solution, then, is to note that the 
strength of a common identity varies from one population to another and the 
claim that a particular nation-state constitutes a community can also vary in 
persuasiveness accordingly. 
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Second, do members of a nation-state share a similar fate? I argue in the 
affirmative. I previously noted that domestic factors such as quality of 
governance allowed countries with similar starting points to enjoy vastly 
different levels of economic wealth several generations later. I now aim to 
provide a theoretical justification for why it is more persuasive to take nation-
states as the unit of analysis in this context. Let me outline a hypothetical 
situation which is simplified for the sake of clarity. Imagine two nation-states, 
where the first (“Diligentia”) adopts values such as hard work thrift and 
practices sustainable development, while the second (“Hedonista”) adopts an 
indulgent and short-sighted approach to policy, expending its natural resources 
at an unsustainable rate. 179 Given the different paths chosen, we should not be 
too surprised if the fates of these two societies diverge over the long term, 
where citizens of Diligentia come to enjoy greater prosperity than the citizens 
of Hedonista. More importantly, the divergent fates of these two nation-states 
appear justified, for each is reaping the fruit that they have sown.  
Redistribution here would entail the perversion of incentives, for countries 
become less inclined to implement sound economic policies, which often 
entail some short term sacrifice, if others are obliged to cushion their fall.180  
 
Even in this simplified situation, cosmopolitans would still be able to argue 
against this proposal for the principle of desert comes up against the principle 
of equality. More precisely, their criticism has to do with how the generations 
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unborn would (in the case of Diligentia) get to enjoy or (in the case of 
Hedonista) suffer the consequences of their forefathers, even though these 
progeny played no part in the decision making process.181 Their privileged 
starting points (or lack thereof) appear morally arbitrary from this perspective. 
I argue that this criticism is not devastating for those who would prioritise the 
nation-state as a site for distributive justice. Rather, this criticism should be 
qualified with two further points of consideration: First, this criticism is not 
strong enough to push for an equalisation of resources or across different 
societies. The critique, more properly framed, calls for equality of opportunity 
no matter where in the world one is situated. Second, theorists could still argue 
for national self-determination as long as they can justify that the overall 
benefits it brings “outweigh(s) the inequalities it will inevitably bring.” 182 
Thus, I believe that the issue is more about contextualizing these benefits 
against the cost of unequal starting points, rather than fear that there is a lack 
of benefits in the first place. 
 
Third, do members of a nation-state necessarily share the same set of social 
meanings when it comes to objects of distribution? I will first explain 
arguments to the contrary before defending this perspective. Opponents 
contend that there is no consensus about the meaning of goods even in the 
same country.183  The implication of this critique is that proponents must 
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either forfeit this criterion or provide additional justification for its validity. 
For instance, the urban and rural populations within a nation-state are likely to 
see the environment with different eyes, with the former taking a more 
instrumental view and the latter appreciating nature for its intrinsic worth. In 
Canada for example, some citizens have organized their lives around 
industries associated with natural resources, such as fishing (Newfoundland), 
farming (Prairies) and logging (British Columbia). 184 For these citizens, the 
value of these natural resources is not simply conceived of in monetary terms, 
but also in symbolic terms as well.185 In contrast, the urban dwellers in the 
same country are more likely to consider these natural resources from a dollars 
and cents perspective. 186 
 
One way out of this difficulty is to argue that citizens of the same nation-state 
need not share consensus as to what each object of distribution entails before 
distributing it.187 Rather, what members of a political community would 
generally share is their recognition of the authority of the state, where they 
would respect (even if they do not always agree with) the law and their 
government. To elaborate, there is usually some agreement about shared 
political processes at a national level (for example, a referendum is considered 
a legitimate way of making decisions), even if there remains disagreement in 
terms of the substance of the matter. The point, then, is not that nation-states 
provide for shared understandings per se, but that states, in being independent 
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legal entities, are uniquely suited as sites for such debates and deliberations to 
take place.188  
 
Having argued that nation-states serve as better candidates for community 
than the universe at large, I now proceed to explain the concept of autonomy. 
 
2.2) Autonomy:  
In relation to the topic of international distributive justice, I propose that the 
autonomy a community possesses should refer to how a community is 
generally justified in terms of deciding upon their own distributive practices 
and, more importantly, in terms of judging the justness of their own 
distributive practices. What is the basis my saying so? The argument that I 
wish to make is here is that communal autonomy stems from our collective 
individual autonomy.189 First, I suggest that we begin with Walzer’s just war 
premise that every individual possess a right to liberty. To elaborate, each of 
us is immersed in a particular socio-political culture from which we make our 
decisions. These socio-political cultures not only play the role of providing us 
with a range of options, but also shape our “capacity for a critical and 
meaningful choice” for it forms the basis from which we make sense of the 
options available to us.190 My point is not to say, however, that culture is 
deterministic of our choices. Rather, as individuals, we constantly make and 
remake the sociopolitical culture in which we are situated. The implication of 
this reiterative process is that the product of our collective decisions becomes 
imbued with the properties we typically associated with individual autonomy, 
                                                
188 Ibid., 278. 
189 Will Kymlicka. Liberalism, Community and Culture. (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1989), 19. 
190 Ibid., 18-19. 
48 
 
such as a sense of dignity and a claim to non-interference. 191 Second, I 
suggest that a certain “live and let live” philosophy guides the concept of 
communal autonomy that I derived from Walzer’s four just causes of war.192 
As argued earlier, just war principles serve to create a protected space in 
which individuals can craft their own preferred way of life, both on the 
individual and collective level. Likewise, one can see the role of communal 
autonomy in international distributive justice as endorsing a similar sort of 
“reasonable pluralism”.193 Reasonable pluralism on a communal level means  
that communities “live in the light of an ideal that makes room for the ideals 
of others”, aiming for “mutual co-existence” rather than the pursuit of any 
predefined good.194 What, then, are the implications of defining communal 
autonomy as such? 
 
First, I argue that defining communal autonomy in the manner I did leads us to 
favour contextualism as an approach to international distributive justice, as 
opposed to universalism. Let me briefly provide a sketch of these two 
approaches before defending my position. Universalism can be understood in 
terms of having the same principles of justice apply across all contexts, 
overriding differences between countries, cultures and institutions.195 Even 
though the application of the principles may vary from situation to situation, 
the principles themselves are the same regardless of the situation. In contrast, 
proponents of contextualism hold that principles of justice vary according to 
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circumstances.196 One should not misunderstand contextualism as there being 
a haphazard or arbitrary choice of principles in different situations. Rather, the 
variation here is systematic, where a particular change in context corresponds 
to a particular change in the principle of justice involved. 197 The concept of 
communal autonomy, then, directs us towards thinking about different 
communities as being the relevant difference in context. 
 
Second, I argue that there are two important implications that follow from my 
definition of communal autonomy. The first implication is that we are more 
likely to see the global poor, or those that would seek our aid more generally, 
as agents who are capable for making their own decisions and are, by default, 
responsible for the outcomes the follow. To elaborate, there are at least two 
ways in which we could frame the distressed, as victims (“people…to whom 
things have happened and are powerless to resist) and as agents (“people who 
make choices that have implications either for themselves or others”).198 One 
scholar who views the distressed as victims is Peter Singer. Singer’s famous 
article, titled Famine, Affluence and Morality, argues that “if it is in our power 
to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing 
anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally to do it.”199 I 
would like to draw attention to the analogy that Singer uses to make his case. 
According to Singer, if we happen to be passing by a “shallow pond” and 
discover that a child is struggling in the water, we are obliged to save the child 
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from drowning.200 Our obligations are as such because such acts are of little 
cost to the rescuer (such as getting one’s clothes muddied) and of great value 
to the victim (whose life is saved).  
 
In contrast to Singer however, I argue that it is dangerous to adopt view that 
the distressed are analogous to helpless children who would drown without 
external assistance. While such a description may be valid in certain cases, we 
should be careful in terms of generalising this description to the global poor at 
large. In the best case scenario, such a mindset leads to benign paternalism, 
where the global poor receive material benefits such as food or funds, but at 
the cost of losing the autonomy that gives them their dignity and self-
respect.201 In the worst case scenario, outsiders’ assumption that they know 
what is best leads to the detriment of the distressed. A case in point is that of 
Zimbabwe, where the United Nations and its World Food Programme worked 
to “distribute 331,000 metric tons of corn and other staples” in the rural areas 
from 2005 to 2007.202 The effect of such aid, however, was to prop up 
Zimbabwe’s authoritarian government.203 To elaborate, President Mugabe was 
trying to displace the poorer citizens from the cities, where they would pose 
the greatest threat to his rule.204 The Zimbabwean government’s condition for 
international aid was that the resources can only be given out in the 
countryside, so as to incentivise the poor to relocate. Ironically, outsiders only 
“saved” the distressed in the short term by exacerbating their problems in the 
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longer term. In sum, I acknowledge that both these perspectives (on seeing the 
distressed as victims or as agents) could be valid depending on context. 
However, I suggest that adopting communal autonomy as an outlook on 
international distributive justice means placing emphasis on the agency of the 
global poor. Such an emphasis is also valuable for providing greater equality 
in the relationship between benefactors and beneficiaries.205 
 
The second implication follows from the first. If we are primarily viewing the 
global poor as agents “who are potentially able to take charge of their own 
lives and improve their situations by their own efforts”, then the obligations 
that different communities owe to each other are relatively minimal.206 The 
question of what this minimal level of obligation entails is an important one, 
for I am not advocating for a situation where the destitute gets left behind their 
national borders should communal autonomy fail. More specifically, what I 
mean to argue here is not that there are no duties to aid the destitute in 
international distributive justice. Rather, my point is that assistance should be 
geared towards helping agents (be it individuals or collectives) to get back on 
their feet again. This discussion on the type of obligation(s) that different 
communities owe to each other then ties back to a debate in the international 
justice literature between the global minimalists and global egalitarians. The 
debate between the two camps is seen as the main cleavage that “runs through 
the literature” and the difference is one of content.207 Global minimalists seek 
to establish a baseline for peoples all over the world and do not view 
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inequality as being inherently problematic. 208 In contrast, global egalitarians 
typically take some variant of equality as the default for a just status, which 
means that inequalities across individuals are unjust unless otherwise 
proven.209 What the concept of communal autonomy does is to inform my 
position in this debate, where my analysis leads me to favour the global 
minimalists’ position over that of the global egalitarians. 
 
2.3) Conclusion: 
Starting with communal autonomy as a premise has led me to favour a 
relational approach to international distributive justice over its non-relational 
counterpart. Unlike most scholars in the international distributive literature, I 
have considered the possibility that the universe at large can constitute a 
community. I argued that it does not currently constitute a community based 
on the features of possessing a common identity, a shared fate and a shared 
understanding on the social meaning of goods. One important qualifier to note 
is that the universe may someday constitute a community, for my analyses is 
contingent upon how the above specified features change throughout the 
course of time. I have also provided justification as to why nation-states come 
closer to my idea of a community as opposed to the universe at large. What 
follows from this analysis is that the type of duties we owe to global poor 
should be minimal, rather than egalitarian, in nature. In terms of moving 
forward, then, the next question that remains to be answered is that of the 
specification of a baseline on how we ought to treat people from around the 
world. I suggest that we can do so by investigating the obligations that soldiers 
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owe to all non-combatants, even those from other political communities, when 



























Jus In Bello & Right To Life 
In this chapter, I explore the jus in bello principle of noncombatant immunity 
and argue that its foundation is the right to life. Noncombatant civilians are 
understood to have rights to life and liberty that cannot be overridden for 
military purposes.210 The reasoning involved here is akin to how a person 
cannot use innocent bystanders as shields, even in self-defence.211  The 
principle of noncombatant immunity occupies a central position in just war 
theory, for it distinguishes acts of war from “mere butchery” that criminals 
might employ.212 Without noncombatant immunity, the term “just war” might 
ring hollow for we run the risk of violating the rights of those whom we 
purport to defend. 213  
 
I have two objectives for this chapter. First, I intend to address what the 
principle of noncombatant immunity entails and to counter some of the most 
potent criticisms of it. Noncombatant immunity can be broken down into three 
constituent principles: double effect, due care and due risk. I examine each 
principle and respond to the main criticisms each has received. Second, and 
more importantly, I trace each principle and make a case that the right to life 
underlies all these principles of noncombatant immunity. This rationale should 
provide insights into how one should think about how negative duty (principle 
of double effect), positive duty (principle of due care) and limits to duty 
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(principle of due risk). I will later apply this insight to international 
distributive justice. 
 
3.1) Non-combatant immunity:  
Noncombatant immunity, simply stated, is that “noncombatants cannot be 
attacked at any time” in waging war.214 There are several terms that need 
elaboration though. First, what distinguishes a noncombatant from a 
combatant? The line drawn between the two is that of noncombatant civilians 
and soldiers (as combatants). There are two exceptions to this rule however. 
The first exception is with regards to soldiers who have surrendered or have 
been captured by enemy forces.215 As they are no longer serve as a credible 
threat to others, they also cease to be legitimate targets for attack themselves. 
The second exception has to do with civilians contributing directly to the war 
effort, such as those working in a munitions factory.216 They become liable to 
attack while in the factory, although not at home, for their labour directly 
threatens soldiers on the opposing end. 217 In contrast, the civilians who 
contribute to the sustenance of society more generally, such as farmers who 
provide food to everyone, are not considered legitimate targets of attack.218 
This distinction stems from the fact that they only contribute to the war effort 
indirectly, by supplying goods that both the soldiers and the citizen population 
need to survive.219  
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Second, what does it mean to not “be attacked”? Taken literally, this phrase 
comes close to prohibiting war-making because noncombatant civilians often 
get hurt when they are near military targets, even when they are not 
themselves targets of attack.220 A more precise reformulation of the principle 
is that noncombatants cannot be intentionally targeted in warfare, though 
unintentional deaths are permissible insofar as 1) there is a “legitimate act of 
war” involved, such as attacking enemy troops and 2) the harm done is 
proportionate to the military aims involved.221 This principle has also come to 
be known as the principle of double effect and more will be said about it the 
following section.222  
 
3.2) Negative duty: Principle of double effect 
In this section, I focus on the principle of double effect and establish why there 
should be a baseline for rules of engagement when it comes to warfare. The 
principle of double effect has been described as “reconciling the absolute 
prohibition against attacking noncombatants with the legitimate conduct of 
military activity”.223 The principle establishes a moral baseline for acts of 
violence, that noncombatants cannot be intentionally targeted, rather than 
leave warfare an all or nothing affair. Although this principle has been 
criticized for being used as an easy excuse (or “a kind of moral sleight of 
hand”) for the death of noncombatant civilians, we should not confuse the 
analytical value of the principle with the (ab)use of it.224 War is a complex 
moral phenomenon where, on the one hand, we want certain codes to be 
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adhered to and on the other we need to consider the impact of these rules on 
the people involved.  The principle of double effect factors in both 
deontological and consequentialist considerations, both of which are needed in 
making moral judgments of war. 225  
 
What grounds are there for the principle of double effect?  
A more important question to consider is why noncombatants enjoy immunity 
from attack in the first place. Michael Walzer discusses this question by 
framing it as a matter of starting points. In a footnote in Just and Unjust Wars, 
he argues that all human beings start by being immune to attack.226 Thus, “the 
theoretical problem is not to describe how immunity is gained, but how it is 
lost. We are all immune to start with; our right not to be attacked is a feature 
of normal human relationships.”227 Under this conceptualization, soldiers lose 
their natural right to immunity when they bear arms, because the weaponry 
allows them to easily violate the immunity of others.  
 
There are two questions that follow from this preliminary discussion. First, 
what does it mean to have a right to immunity? Second, why does Walzer 
choose to take immunity from physical attack as a default over other 
alternatives? I will go through each in turn.  
 
I argue that the right to immunity can be conceived of as a right to life in the 
context of just war. I first make a case that the immunity that Walzer speaks of 
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can be reframed as a right to physical security. This reframe should not be too 
contentious, for the immunity that Walzer is referring to is immunity from 
physical attack. The desired outcome in this case is our physical security, for it 
is precisely what is being protected when individuals are granted immunity 
from physical violence. Next, I argue that a right to physical security can be 
understood as a right to life in the context of just war, leaving open how a 
right to life might be interpreted in other circumstances. There exists a variety 
of conceptions about what a right to life might entail, but I wish to advocate 
for a minimalist conception with only negative duties in order to secure an 
agreed upon baseline.  Against the backdrop of warring parties, I simply take 
the right to life to mean that individuals are not allowed to threaten each other 
via physical violence such as  “murder, torture, mayhem, rape or assault”, 
thereby leaving each non-combatants able to go about their daily affairs.228 
 
Second, I aim to explain why Walzer chooses to take immunity from physical 
attack as a default. Walzer’s account stands in contrast to at least two 
alternatives on offer. My goal, then, is to flesh out Walzer’s rationale through 
by comparing the differences between the various alternatives. The first 
alternative model takes being killed in wartime as a default.229 According to 
proponents of this view, there is little of moral significance to distinguish a 
civilian from a soldier. Given that war is a collective effort, the factors that 
prevent one from being a member of the armed forces could be that of being 
too young or too old, whose health conditions or profession disqualifies him or 
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her and so on.230 These factors seem morally arbitrary in terms of excusing 
one from the “common danger” that confronts the nation-state.231 In other 
words, if soldiers are merely “coerced civilians” who have been forced to 
fight, why should we attack only them and spare the others? 232  
 
This approach seems mistaken to me because it takes the wrong condition, that 
of a totalising war, as its starting point for just war theorizing.233 Just war 
theory provides a middle ground between pacifism and realism. According to 
just war advocates, war can be fought (thereby moving them away from those 
at the pacifist end of the spectrum) but only with very strict moral restraints 
(thereby avoiding the realist extreme of war as hell). Proponents of this first 
alternative model seem to have gotten the logic backward when they assume 
the worst (that there are no limits to war, at least in terms of who may be 
legitimately killed) and then attempt to provide moral justification for it. 
Alternatively framed, they are working from the realist end of the spectrum 
and arguing for a case of no rules in war. It might be more fruitful to work 
from the pacifist end to figure out what the exceptions to peacetime conduct 
are and then examine the grounds for their justification. In the strongest 
version of this argument, soldiers who have volunteered to serve in the 
military have given (tacit) consent to the risks that they will undertake in 
doing so, such as being targeted by enemy forces.234 Such consent makes a 
difference. One can draw an analogy between the soldiers’ activities to that of 
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boxers in a ring, in the match (or war), they can attack each other in a way that 
would otherwise be forbidden under other circumstances.235 The case becomes 
trickier when soldiers have been conscripted into the military, for there is 
presumably lesser free will involved.236  What matters here, then, is that 
soldiers are still generally liable to attack for the following reasons: First, they 
pose a threat (by virtue of their status) and are psychologically prepared for 
being threatened in return.237 Second, they are trained, able and equipped to 
attack and defend themselves.238 Noncombatant civilians, by contrast, are 
unsuspecting and unprepared to face enemy fire. This line, imperfect as it is, 
nonetheless preserves a crucial distinction between those who are legitimate 
military targets and those who are not, thereby minimizing the hellishness of 
war. 
 
The second alternative model is a challenge not to noncombatant immunity 
but to the conceptual divide between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. According 
to Jeff McMahan, the justice of one’s cause is crucial in terms of evaluating 
the range of permissible actions available to soldiers as well as policymakers. 
McMahan’s thesis is that those with a just cause should not be subject to 
attack by their counterparts who fight on behalf of an unjust cause.239 This 
position has also come to be known as the revisionist account to just war 
theory. An analogy that illustrates this logic would be that a bank robber is not 
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entitled to attack a police officer, even in self-defence.240 The implication, 
then, is that those fighting on the just side are allowed a generous threshold, 
even to the extent of attacking noncombatants, as long as it contributes to their 
victory.241  If we extend this logic further, McMahan’s reasoning entails 
making discretionary judgments on the blameworthiness of individuals 
because members of the unjust side do not contribute equally to war. For 
example, it is absurd to hold an infant on the unjust side as contributing to the 
war effort in any meaningful sense. In contrast, a well-informed and well paid 
military officer could be held liable for participating in a wrongful war and 
punished accordingly.242  
 
The problem with this view is that it is unpersuasive. First, it fails on its own 
terms (that the justice of the cause determines a permissible range of actions) 
because even just warriors are expected to adhere to certain rules of conduct. 
Returning to the analogy made previously, even police officers are not 
permitted to “kill those guilty of injustice” and must abide by rules of 
proportionality when it comes to capturing criminals. Punishment, if merited, 
is determined by a judge, not officers on the spot.243 Second, and more 
importantly, the frame of reference for jus in bello should not be enacting 
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vigilante justice but defending the defenceless.244 It is unfair, at least construed 
in terms of having a fair fight, to allow soldiers to attack noncombatant 
civilians who are generally not in a position to defend themselves, much less 
retaliate.245 Some scholars have framed this defence as a matter of practicality 
in an attempt to discount its moral worth. For example, some have framed the 
issue in terms of death count: soldiers on both sides are likely to think of their 
own cause as just, leading to greater bloodshed under the revisionist account 
as compared to the traditional framework for just war.246 An alternative 
framing that appeals to practicality involves a jus post bellum consideration, 
where acts of restraint is perceived as fighting honourably, making peace 
possible in the longer term.247 
 
In response to McMahan’s argument, I follow Walzer in arguing that the most 
compelling account of the just war tradition comes from correctly perceiving 
the nature of war.248 War is a collective effort that pits large numbers of 
people against each other and can best be described as a “collectively coercive 
enterprise”.249 To elaborate, war is an enterprise where even noncombatant 
civilians contribute indirectly through their provision of time, energy and 
resources to sustain their soldiers on the frontline. 250 Consequently, any 
moralizing of war needs to take into account this feature when it comes to 
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conceptualizing its rules and standards.251 McMahan’s attempt to translate 
peacetime standards of individual ethics (judging the blameworthiness of each 
citizen) into the morality of war is not only impractical, but more importantly, 
inappropriate for disaggregating the collective moral responsibility that 
follows from wartime actions.252   
 
3.3) Positive duty: Principle of due care 
In the previous section, I explained why soldiers have at least negative duties 
towards noncombatant civilians, in the sense of not causing any of them 
intentional harm. Here, I go a step further and examine why soldiers have a 
positive commitment when it comes to safety of noncombatant civilians via 
the principle of due care. 
 
In Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer describes the principle of due care as one that 
qualifies the principle of double effect. 253 To recap, the principle of double 
effect disallows the intentional targeting of non-combatants, although the 
accidental killing of non-combatants in the vicinity is permissible.254  His 
concern is that the principle of double effect does not go far enough in terms 
of restricting the number of civilian deaths, for even a large number of deaths 
can be justified so long as it is proportionate to the military aims involved.255 
For the skeptics, there is little difference between foreseeing civilian deaths 
                                                
251 Ibid., 932. 
252Michael Walzer, “Response to McMahan’s Paper”, Philosophia, 34. No 1 (2006): 45.. 
253 Michael Walzer,. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. 
(Basic Books 1977, 4th Edition, 2006), 155.  
254 Ibid., 152. 
255 Ibid., 153. 
64 
 
and intending them.256 Consequently, Walzer introduces the principle of due 
care, which entails “some sign of a positive commitment to save civilian 
lives”, even if it comes at the expense of additional risks to the soldiers.257  
Those who would prefer a more specific articulation of the principle may find 
it frustrating that Walzer does not provide a formula for implementing it. 
Rather, he fleshes out the principle by illustrating how it would work in 
particular situations. For example, Walzer recounts an incident, drawn from 
the memoirs of an English infantryman, about how shouting into the cellars in 
which noncombatant civilians might be hiding before bombing them fulfilled 
the principle of due care.258 These cellars might have been occupied by 
German soldiers lying in ambush as well. If all the English soldiers cared 
about was military success, the prudent course would be to throw bombs into 
the cellars without warning, excusing civilian deaths incurred under the 
principle of double effect. Yet these soldiers shouted so as to give fair warning 
to noncombatant civilians who would otherwise have been “innocently 
murdered”.259 The willingness to bear such risks is the mark of due care. Other 
examples of due care include using weapons that limit harm (such as laser-
guided cruise missiles), moving closer to targets at the risk of being exposed 
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Why do soldiers owe non-combatant civilians due care?  
The justification behind the principle of due care is not explicitly elucidated 
by Walzer. Walzer does note that “simply not to intend the death of civilians is 
too easy; most often, under battle conditions, the intentions of soldiers are 
focused narrowly on the enemy.”261  However, this statement itself begs 
further questions as to why the standard needs to be higher than simply not 
targeting noncombatant civilians intentionally. In other words, how does the 
distinction between combatants and noncombatants map onto the principle of 
due care (and the positive duty that come with it)?  
 
I argue that the main consideration here is that the noncombatants’ right to life 
have been violated when soldiers foreseeably and deliberately place them at 
risk of injury or death. What then, does it mean to violate someone’s right to 
life? I will attempt to answer this question with reference to two analogies. In 
the first analogy, the person involved chooses to buy the biggest car possible 
so as to enjoy maximum protection in case of an accident. However, choosing 
such a vehicle also increases the risk borne by those who drive smaller 
vehicles, for they are likely to suffer more damage during a collision.262 Even 
with these potentially negative implications, we do not see the purchase of a 
bigger car as a wrongful act. In the second analogy, let us imagine someone 
who works in a nuclear plant.263  If something goes wrong at the plant and the 
employee has the choice of staying behind to keep the danger under control or 
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running away and leaving innocent bystanders at risk, we would almost 
certainly fault the employee for fleeing the scene.264   
 
What marks the difference between these two situations? In both cases, the 
actions of one person could lead to the detriment of others, but we find the 
latter blameworthy whereas the former is not. I argue that the standard that we 
should use is if the action itself endangers the lives of others. In the first 
analogy, driving a large car does not in itself place the lives of others at risk. 
Rather, it is a car accident that does. Consequently, we would attribute 
responsibility to the driver whose negligence caused the collision, regardless 
of the size of the car. Size only affects the extent of risk (offering protection to 
its driver at the expense of others) and is more accurately framed as a 
threshold that one is not permissible to cross. The same standard of whether an 
action endangers the lives of others applies to the second analogy as well. In 
this case, a person working in the nuclear plant maintains its functioning and 
consequently, its potential for harming others. Thus, we would expect that 
person to help mitigate the risk.  
 
Having elucidated a source for positive duty, I now relate the two analogies to 
just war theory and ask which is soldiering more similar to and why. I argue 
that the second analogy comes closer to soldiering for it is the deliberate and 
foreseeable acts of warfare by soldiers that put civilian lives in danger. If we 
were to draw a parallel to the analogy, soldiers (like the workers in the plant) 
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owe noncombatants (innocent bystanders) some effort to shield them from 
harm because they are the ones who have violated the latter’s right to life.265  
 
There are also two other reasons to hold soldiers responsible for due care, 
which I will outline here. The first concerns their profession, which for the 
most part is to defend the innocents in their own country.266 A comparison can 
be made to related professions such as firemen and policemen, for example, 
where the code of honour dictates saving the lives of noncombatant civilians 
at the risk of one’s own. Given a soldier’s reasons for fighting, it is 
hypocritical to treat innocents (more generally, regardless of nationality) with 
less than the care they deserve. Associative obligations, in the form of 
citizenship, are irrelevant here for the reason I outlined above, which is that a 
minimally acceptable level of protection is owed to those we put in danger, 
regardless of their identity.267 That said, soldiers can still choose to bear 
greater risks for their fellow nationals if they wish, for there is no imposition 
of an universal standard for risk taking, only that of a baseline.268   
 
The second reason is that soldiers are better equipped to take risk in dangerous 
situations. They have typically undergone the appropriate training, possess 
weapons, wear protective gear, work in coordinated teams and have medical 
support should the need arise.269 In all these relevant respects, soldiers stand 
superior to noncombatant civilians in being able to bear equivalent risk at 
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lower cost to themselves.270 There is little point in assigning responsibility to 
an agent who is unable to carry it out.  
 
Given the qualities outlined earlier, I have now made a case that soldiers not 
only should, but also can be held morally responsible for due care to others. 
 
3.4) Limits to duty: Principle of due risk 
Thus far, I have a made a case for negative duty (that noncombatants enjoy a 
right to life in the form of immunity from physical attack) and positive duty 
(they enjoy due care because combatants are causally and morally responsible 
for endangering their lives). I now turn my attention to the limit of positive 
duty and argue that it is also the right to life that serves as a guide to how far 
this duty extends. 
 
Having outlined the requirements of due care previously, I now move on to 
describe what the limits of the principle are and, more importantly, why the 
line is drawn where it is.  Walzer defines the maximum threshold for due care, 
also known as the principle of due risk, as “roughly at the point where any 
further risk-taking would almost certainly doom the military venture or make 
it so costly that it could not be repeated.”271 For example, the principle of due 
care may require pilots to fly at lower altitudes to hit a legitimate military 
targets, such as a munitions factory, even though flying low exposes them to 
greater risk.272 More precise targeting means fewer civilian casualties. What 
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goes beyond the principle of due risk, however, is to require that the same 
attack be carried out by commandos.273 A commando attack would have made 
for even more precise targeting. However, the commandoes would also be 
exposed to an unreasonable level of risk, for the heavy security on the ground 
would very likely both thwart the military operation and cost them their lives. 
274  Another consideration is whether the operation was a one-off affair (where 
greater risks can be borne) or repetitive (where risks have to be moderated).275  
In the case of the latter, repetition means greater cost, which must be 
accounted for.  
 
How does the principle of due risk demarcate boundaries? 
The implication of limiting due care is that noncombatant civilians are not 
guaranteed “fail-safe immunity” in war.276 Rather, the principle of due care 
comes close to, but deliberately falls short of, such a standard. One 
interpretation of the rationale behind due risk could be that it would be 
impossible to wage war otherwise, for noncombatant civilians are nearly 
always endangered in fighting (unless it occurs in uninhabited areas such as at 
sea or in the desert).277 By drawing the boundary where he does, Walzer 
defines a space where one can fight a war but is held to a very high moral 
standard while doing so. In contrast, a deontological pacifist would insist upon 
the absolute protection of noncombatant civilians as a means of enforcing their 
right to life. As such rights cannot be enforced during war, it follows that war 
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itself is impermissible.278 A second interpretation of rationale behind Walzer’s 
account of due risk is that soldiers are, among other things, resources 
commanders have at their disposal.279 It is part of the command responsibility 
to ensure that military resources are used prudently.280 Consequently, the 
inefficient allocation of resources, such as insisting on expending resources on 
an unprofitable military venture, is an action for which we can hold 
commanders accountable. 281 When framed in such a manner, the limits of due 
care becomes less of a moral question and more of a practical consideration. 
Noncombatants are not guaranteed a fail-safe immunity because it might entail 
a disproportionate number of soldiers to do so.  
 
I argue that there is a more compelling interpretation that grounds the 
principle of due risk than by either going down the war is legitimate route or 
appealing to a prudent use of resources. My reading of Walzer suggests that 
the strongest rationale behind the principle of due risk is the right to life, 
except it is the combatants’ and not the noncombatants’ right I am referring 
to.282 To recap, Walzer starts his just war account by noting that all humans 
have a right to life and liberty.283 Although Walzer remains hesitant to label 
these rights natural, they do fulfil the criteria of belonging to all men and 
being inherent to our nature (in other words, not conferred by some social 
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contract).284 Thus, it is not quite accurate to say that soldiers lose their rights 
when they take up arms, for their right is not contingent upon being a civilian. 
Rather, a more precise formulation of their role is that they retain their right to 
life but take on additional risks in defending the rights of their community.285 
These additional risks include, but are not limited to, becoming legitimate 
targets of the enemy, bearing responsibility to safeguard civilian lives above 
one’s own and so on. When framed in such a manner, the reason why there is 
a limit to due care is that of respecting the soldiers’ right to life. To be sure, 
soldiers are disallowed from prioritising their welfare over that of the 
noncombatants, since it is their actions that created the risks (albeit 
unintentionally) in the first place. However, their own safety is also of moral 
value and cannot be discounted entirely. It is striking, then, that the conflicting 
obligations of due care and due risk in fact share the same moral foundation: 
that of the right to life.286 
 
3.5) Conclusion: 
In this chapter, I have traced the development of the jus in bello principles in 
noncombatant immunity and argued that the right to life informs each of the 
three principles involved. Noncombatant immunity is informed first and 
foremost by a correct diagnosis of what the relationships between humans are, 
which is that no one is liable to being attacked under normal circumstances. I 
have made a case that this right to immunity can be understood as a right to 
life in the context of war. Such a diagnosis informs the principle of double 
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effect, where there is a negative duty that forbids one from intentionally 
attacking noncombatant civilians as a default. Second, combatants are held to 
a higher standard of due care, a positive duty, because they violate 
noncombatants’ right to life by placing them under foreseeable and deliberate 
risks that endangers their safety. Finally, the limits to a combatant’s duty to 
noncombatants can be understood as striking a balance between both their 
rights to life. We cannot ask soldiers to risk their lives for noncombatants 
beyond a reasonable threshold, such as one that will almost certainly kill them. 
It is to the translation of these insights to the context of international 



















Right to Life & Duties in International Distributive Justice 
What are our negative duty, positive duty and limits to duty when it comes to 
international distributive justice? The goal of this chapter is to answer these 
questions. Before I begin however, I wish to lay the groundwork by 
establishing two points. First, I want to make the case that how we answer 
these questions is important in thinking about international distributive justice. 
I do so by outlining the conceptual difference between negative and positive 
duty and exploring the moral significance of such a difference. Second, I want 
to explain what the right to life means in the context of international 
distributive justice, for the concept does not translate directly from its just war 
form (right to physical security) to distribution. 
 
What is the conceptual difference between positive and negative duty? 
The term ‘negative duty’ is commonly understood as refraining from certain 
actions, especially those that do wrong to others. 287  In the context of 
international distributive justice, an example of a negative duty is that of non-
exploitation of other people, where exploitation could be understood as forced 
labour in sweatshop conditions. In contrast, the term ‘positive duty’ entails a 
person proactively doing good for someone else.288 For instance, one could 
fulfil a positive duty by donating funds towards the cause of international 
development.   
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What is the moral significance of this difference?  
There are two key areas in which the difference between the two duties is 
morally significant. First, negative duties are seen as duties of justice whereas 
positive duties are seen as duties of beneficence. 289  What, then, is the 
implication of such differences in characterisation? In a nutshell, the former 
(duties of justice) are stringent and enforceable whereas the latter (duties of 
beneficence) are seen as a matter of goodwill.290 While it is possible to make a 
case that some positive duties are also duties of justice, such a premise is 
controversial, leading to less support for the substantive points that follow.291 
Second, negative duties are universal whereas positive duties are not. For 
example, the right to physical security can generally be construed as an 
universal negative duty, where “if anyone has a duty not to maim me, then 
surely everyone has.”292 When it comes to a positive duty to provide physical 
security, such as the creating and maintaining a police force, for example, it is 
reasonable to say that such duties are owed only to those we share special 
relationships with, such as our fellow nationals or society members.293 The 
key implication here is that one of the most powerful way to argue for global 
poverty alleviation is to explore how the global rich may have violated their 
universal negative duties and owe the global poor compensation (rather than 
beneficence) in the form of positive duties.294  
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4.1) Right to life: Security & subsistence. 
The term “right to life” could be understood to take on different meanings in 
different contexts. In the context of war, the right to life is understood as a 
right to physical security, where individuals are not permitted to attack each 
other as a default. However, this understanding of a right to life does not 
translate easily to the context of distribution, for we are not concerned about 
issues such as torture or assault here.295   
 
In order to translate this concept into another context, I suggest that we 
examine the central theme that connects the different meanings of a right to 
life together, thereby giving the concept its coherence. I suggest that this 
central theme is that of a basic right, which can be understood as being 
fundamental to the “enjoyment of all other rights.” 296 A right to physical 
security fits the bill here for we are unable to enjoy other rights, such a right to 
assemble, a right to free press and so on, unless we are reasonably confident of 
our safety in those circumstances. In the context of distribution, then, a basic 
right that emerges is one of subsistence, for it is necessary to have subsistence 
before we can enjoy other rights as well. A right to subsistence can be defined 
as having a right to access necessities such as air, water, food, clothing, shelter 
and basic healthcare.297 Even though the exact boundaries of what counts as 
“necessary” (and what does not) may be in dispute, the elements included in 
this list should be relatively non-controversial in terms of being the bare 
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minimum that most would need for survival.298 Finally, I wish to highlight the 
exploratory nature of my work by noting that not all is lost should critics find 
my interpretation of subsistence rights as a right to life inadequate. Although I 
do go on to defend my chosen interpretation in the following paragraphs, 
others can still make use of my approach (using the right to life as guide) 
while using their own preferred interpretation instead. 
 
Why use subsistence rights as a guide to duty? 
There are two objections that one could raise when it comes to using a right to 
subsistence as a guide to thinking about our duty in the context of international 
distributive justice. The first objection is that it imposes too low a limit. The 
second objection is that it imposes too high a limit. It is my hope that through 
a discussion and then rejection of these other two alternatives, I make a case 
that a right to subsistence is the best place to draw the line.  
 
Subsistence rights: Too low a limit? 
For scholars who are strong advocates for the eradication of global poverty, 
setting the bar at subsistence rights seems to absolve individuals and states of 
the more demanding obligations that we might owe to the global poor.299 In 
simpler terms, their objection would be that we are not doing enough towards 
a worthy cause.  
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There are two points I would make in response to such a critique. First, setting 
a limit to our duty does not imply that charity beyond this level is forbidden or 
discouraged. To the contrary, going above one’s mandatory requirements is 
very much praiseworthy. There is, however, a crucial difference between 
celebrating such efforts and requiring them. We need to be careful not to 
conflate the two. Second, and more importantly, I argue that just war theory 
does not lend itself to a more demanding principle to guide our thinking about 
duties in international distributive justice. One of the ways in which we can 
categorise different viewpoints within the international distributive justice 
literature is in terms of the starting points that different scholars invoke. In 
order to describe my position more concretely, I will reference two other 
scholars who draw upon a different starting point to explain why I reach a 
different conclusion than they do. 
 
The first scholar is Charles Beitz, who is notable for extending John Rawls’ 
principles of justice from the domestic realm to the international realm in his 
book Political Theory and International Relations. More specifically, he 
extends Rawls’ point on the distribution of talent across individuals being 
‘morally arbitrary’ to the distribution of natural resource across countries.300 
What moral arbitrariness refers to here is that an agent (be it an individual or a 
corporate entity) cannot be held responsible a certain quality for it arises 
through no fault or merit of their own.301 For example, a morally arbitrary 
feature is being born female and consequently having to deal with fewer 
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opportunities in a patriarchal society. Distribution should not be tied to the 
possession (or lack thereof) of such qualities. To the contrary, a just 
distribution may demand that we change our current practices in order to 
correct injustice. The amount of natural resources that a country possesses is 
morally arbitrary because its citizens cannot earn or deserve it per se. Given 
the moral arbitrariness of resource distribution across countries, Beitz suggests 
that steps should be taken to correct for such an inequality, such that “each 
society would have a fair chance to develop just political institutions and an 
economy capable of satisfying it members’ basic needs”.302 The solution that 
Beitz proposes, then, is to solve global inequality by elevating the difference 
principle (that inequalities can be justified if they provide “greatest benefit to 
the least advantaged”303) from the domestic context to the global one.304 Given 
this theoretical backdrop, one can imagine Beitz arguing that I have 
shortchanged the global poor by only arguing for minimally adequate 
arrangements in the form of subsistence rights, rather than the actualisation of 
the global difference principle. 
 
A second theorist that pushes for a more robust account of international 
distributive justice is Simon Caney. Like Beitz, Caney also invokes Rawls’ 
concept of moral arbitrariness in order to make his argument, except that he 
refers to nationality rather than individuals’ talents or the distribution of 
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natural resources.305 To elaborate, being born into a developing country (rather 
than a developed country) means having to deal with considerably poorer 
prospects in life and yet, the country of one birth’s is morally arbitrary in that 
it lies beyond one’s control. Caney’s proposed solution to this apparent 
injustice is to advocate for global equality of opportunity, which he describes 
as such, “persons of different nations should enjoy equal opportunities: no one 
should face worse opportunities because of their nationality.”306 Another way 
to understand what fair equality of opportunity means is to draw upon Rawls’ 
original description of the concept, where he states that people with ‘the same 
level of talent and ability and the same willingness to use these gifts should 
have the same prospects of success…In all parts of society there are to be 
roughly the same… prospects of achievement”.307 Like Beitz, then, Caney will 
find my standard of subsistence rights objectionable for it does not correct 
sufficiently for the arbitrariness of nationality. 
 
I outline Beitz’s and Caney’s arguments because I want to highlight the 
importance of premises in making arguments for how international 
distribution should work. In using just war theory as the basis for my 
argument, I begin only with the claim that humans everywhere possess a right 
to life and liberty. Unlike Beitz and Caney, I do not begin with the premise 
that moral arbitrariness ought to be mitigated in order to achieve a just state 
of affairs. The main reason why I do not follow in their footsteps is because 
their premise does not follow from my discussion of just war theory. With 
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reference to Beitz’s argument, there may be different distribution of natural 
resources in various countries that might provide one country with more raw 
material or funds to buy weaponry than its opponents, thereby increasing its 
chances for military success. However, there is no basis from just war theory 
to classify this situation as an unfair one. Similarly, drawing upon Caney’s 
argument, there are some militaries that discriminate against combatants with 
morally arbitrary features, such as those who identify as gay, lesbian or 
bisexual.308 Just war theory stays silent about whether these militaries ought to 
be reformed (or not), not because theorists consider this a fair situation, but 
because such issues lie beyond the scope of the paradigm.  
 
Subsistence rights: Too high a limit? 
Critics, especially those of a libertarian disposition, may argue that avoidance 
of wrongdoing should guide our thinking about our duty to others, rather than 
subsistence rights. In their view, we owe only negative duty to others whereas 
an obligation to provide subsistence to others appears more as a positive duty 
for it requires assistance in some kind, usually in the form of humanitarian aid. 
 
In my view, this criticism is misplaced for it frames the idea of using the right 
to subsistence as a guide to our duty wrongly. The goal here is not to provide 
assistance to others per se, “in other words, not that we protect, rescue, feed, 
clothe, and house them.”309 The goal, more accurately framed, is to remedy 
culpability when we violate the right to life that others possess. The important 
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implication, then, is that my view actually converges with the libertarian 
perspective in that our positive duty only arises when we fail to abide by our 
negative duty. How then, does the remedy of culpability relate to thinking 
about duty in international distributive justice? My answer here is twofold. 
First, it means that the positive duty is restricted to particular individuals and 
nation-states rather than imposed indiscriminately on the world at large. More 
precisely, positive duty only applies to those who have performed wrongdoing 
of some kind, such as “those who impose a coercive institutional order upon 
(the global poor).”310 Another way of framing this same point is to argue that 
the history of global poverty matters and to cite evidence that a combination of 
global actors, global institutions and domestic factors contribute to the 
systemic perpetuation of global poverty. We are merely correcting for the 
effects of global factors here.  
 
Second, aiming at subsistence rights is not too high a limit for it merely 
restores “autonomous agency” for those who “if only they had been born into 
different social circumstances, would be just as able and likely to lead healthy, 
happy, and productive lives as the rest of us.”311 This point on restoring 
autonomous agency comes from Kant and has been invoked by various 
Kantian scholars to make a case for international distributive justice. For 
example, Elizabeth Ashford frames Kant’s “core claim (as) each person’s 
moral status (being) grounded on their dignity as a rational autonomous agent, 
capable of setting their own ends and of acknowledging and acting on moral 
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reasons.”312 What Ashford infers from this claim is that having access to basic 
necessities forms the prerequisite for individuals to set and pursue their own 
purposes. 313 Otherwise, the poor are left entirely at the mercy of those who 
provide private charity, leaving their benefactors in control of their ends, even 
if their benefactor(s) never chooses to exercise such power over them.314 Pablo 
Gilabert agrees with Ashford on this inference, arguing that what it means to 
respect agents as ends in themselves, and not merely means, is to come to their 
aid when they lose their ability to function as autonomous agents. 315 In sum, 
what the provision of subsistence rights does is to “preserve independence” 
and enable individuals to take responsibility for their own lives again.316 
 
Having outlined what the right to life means in the international distributive 
context, I now proceed to connect this concept to our negative duty. 
 
4.2) Negative duties in international distributive justice: 
I attempt to cover the following items in this section. First, I propose two 
negative duties in the context of international distributive justice that those 
involved (both policymakers and citizens) ought to obey. Second, I justify 
why those negative duties ought to exist based on the insight from just war 
theory, that the right to life informs the duties we are bound to.  
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Negative interactional duty: 
I define the first negative duty as a negative interactional duty, where 
responsible agents have an obligation not to participate directly in activities 
that places non-trivial constraints on the freedom of others to pursue their 
rights to subsistence.317 The three key elements here are that of “a responsible 
agent”, “non-trivial constraints” on freedom and the question of what “a 
suitable baseline” would look like. I will examine each in turn. 
 
First, with regards to the actor involved (a responsible agent), the idea here is 
that the agent involved should be able to bear moral responsibility. There are 
several qualities that such agents need to possess before we can hold them 
accountable to their actions, such as possessing the capacity for deliberation, 
ability to restrain oneself and empathy for example.318 It is precisely these 
qualities that enable agents to foresee and comprehend the consequences of his 
action(s), making them blameworthy if moral wrongdoing occurs during the 
process.319 When it comes to international distributive justice however, it is 
not just individuals we need to consider but also collectives, institutionalised 
in the form of states and international governmental organisations. These 
collectives play an equivalent, if not greater, role in this context. I propose that 
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we take into account two more qualities for collectives to be considered 
responsible agents. The first quality is a corporate identity, which allows the 
institution to be considered more than the sum of its parts.320 The second 
quality is possessing a structure for decision making, so that its goals can be 
pursued in a logical and unified fashion.321 
 
Second, I take non-trivial constraints to freedom in pursuing their rights to 
subsistence as a benchmark for activities that we should not be participating 
in. The first quality, non-trivial constraints to freedom, is included so as to 
discount trivial constraints from being violations of our negative duty. An 
example of a trivial constraint that Valentini cites is that of two individuals 
having a tea break together and one person eating the last biscuit, thereby 
preventing the other from the opportunity of doing so.322 Even though one 
person’s freedom has been violated in the strict sense of the word, it is not 
serious enough to warrant a discussion on justice. I also differ from other 
scholars who begin with our negative duties, such as Thomas Pogge in his 
book World Poverty and Human Rights, by rejecting a harm based perspective 
as the basis of our duties. I do so because Arthur Ripstein makes a convincing 
case that using a harm based perspective is inadequate if we wish to explain 
harms that are not necessarily wrong, such as how innovation in one 
company’s product offerings may (legitimately) lure customers away from 
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another. 323  Likewise, in the context of international distributive justice, 
countries or individuals that capitalise on their comparative advantage are not 
necessarily harming the global poor in a wrongful manner. The second quality, 
the freedom to pursue our rights to subsistence means having the freedom to 
access basic necessities. I will use a hypothetical example to illustrate what I 
am trying to describe in this case. Consider how several countries, A, B and C 
share a river that starts at Country A and ends at Country C. Citizens that live 
nearby (which includes people from all three countries) are free to use the 
water for a variety of purposes, such as for drinking, cooking and cleaning.  In 
this case, what I take to be a non-trivial constraint on freedom is for Country 
A to discharge pollutants into the river, causing the water to no longer be 
potable for downstream users in Country B and C. It is in contexts like that 
that I would argue that Country A violated the right to subsistence of people 
living downstream, for water is a basic necessity covered under our right to 
subsistence.  
 
Third, the question of an appropriate standard (a suitable baseline) is 
necessary for us to determine whether unjust violations of someone’s right to 
life have occurred. There are two standards we could use. The first, a lower 
one, simply asks us to imagine a situation where such violations have not 
taken place and compare it against the current circumstances.324 In contrast, 
the second standard requires us to picture a morally ideal situation and 
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compare the current circumstance to this ideal. 325  Let us return to the 
hypothetical example brought up in the previous paragraph to describe the 
difference between these two standards more tangibly. What the first standard 
entails is to compare the before situation (where Country A, B and C were 
sharing the river) with the after situation (where Country A released pollutants 
into the river, thereby making it dangerous for downstream users in Country B 
and C to consume). However, what the second standard requires is for us to 
compare a morally ideal situation (where the sharing of water resources 
between Country A, B and C happens in accordance to a moral principle, such 
as the basis of need) and the after situation (where pollution has already taken 
place). I argue that the former is more appropriate in this situation because we 
are considering enforceable duties of justice, rather than what is merely good 
to have.  If we can show that certain acts cannot adhere to even this lower 
threshold, we can make a more persuasive case that a negative duty has indeed 
been violated. 
 
Negative institutional duty: 
The second negative duty, which I will call a negative institutional duty, is an 
obligation not to participate in a system that “foreseeably and avoidably” 
exploits or oppresses the global poor, for we indirectly constraint their 
freedom to pursue their right to subsistence in doing so.326   
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There are again three elements for consideration: “a system of rules”, “non-
trivial” and impermissible harm and “a suitable baseline”. 327  Having 
considered the last two elements previously, I focus my discussion here on the 
first, a system of rules. In this case, a system of rules could be understood as a 
set of processes, “informal social practices” or “patterns of interaction” that 
govern international affairs. 328  The main characteristic that makes these 
systems of rules a relevant consideration is that they cannot be reduce to a 
responsible individual or collective agent.329 Rather, a system of rules requires 
the support of all those who subscribe to it in one sense or another in order to 
function properly, making them complicit to varying degrees if the system 
proves exploitative.330  
 
What does it mean to support a system of rules that exploits others? One 
historical example that has been given is to support the practice of slavery, 
where the responsibility of the masses lie in labouring in the slave trade 
through supporting roles, buying products from owners who primarily use 
slaves on their plantations, paying taxes to a government that supports such 
measures and so on.331 Another example involves the prohibition of particular 
actions in public sites, such as being disallowed to consume food or ablution 
for example. 332 The impact of such legislation is that the homeless are denied 
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“any location in which they can legally perform basic necessities of life.”333 In 
terms of   contextualising this discussion to international distributive justice, I 
cite one example from Thomas Pogge, which is that of the international 
resource privilege. According to Pogge, the international resource privilege 
can be defined as a system of rules that allow the group in power to “effect 
legally valid transfers of ownership rights in such resources.334” In other 
words, a country’s rulers have the authority to manage the country’s natural 
resources, regardless of how they came to power or how barbaric their rule 
might be. 335 The absurdity of this framework is better explained when we 
draw an analogy to a domestic case. Let us imagine a scenario where criminals 
take control of a bank and all the possessions within it.336 While they can sell 
the valuable items within the bank’s vaults to others, such sales are not 
typically seen as justified or legitimate. More precisely, the criminals merely 
act to transfer the possession of items from themselves to others, and not the 
rights of ownership.337 In the international version, a group of leaders could 
likewise come to power through illegitimate means (such as a military coup 
that hijacks the democratic process). What is different, however, is that these 
leaders not only retain the possession but also come to acquire the rights to a 
country’s resources, which they can then sell to others for a tidy profit.338 
 
The international resource privilege relates to negative institutional duty 
because the former generally enables non-democratic rulers to undermine their 
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citizens’ freedom to pursue their right to subsistence. First, profits gained from 
the sale of a country’s natural resources tend to be used by these rulers to 
enhance their own military power and profiting their supporters.339 Such 
actions decrease the possibility that citizens would gain the democratic rights 
with which they can “demand a subsistence income”.340 A real life case study 
exemplifying this point would be Nigeria, where oil exports amount to a 
staggering 2 million barrels per day and contribute to more than 25% of the 
country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).341 Not coincidentally, Nigeria has 
also experienced military rule for 28 out of the last 38 years.342 Second, as 
these non-democratic rulers rely more on brute force rather than popular 
support to rule, there is little incentive for them to share the profits from the 
sale of natural resources with the people.343 Consequently, the typical citizen 
in these countries are disadvantaged in terms of their “opportunities to make a 
living”, for they lack access to mechanisms such as seed funds to start their 
own businesses for example. Third, when these non-democratic rulers deplete 
the country’s natural resources for their own short term gain rather than 
practice stewardship, they deprive their citizens of the opportunity to use these 
same resources to gain subsistence in the longer term.344  
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Having established a connection between negative institutional duty and 
international resource privilege in the previous paragraph, I now address the 
criticism that the international resource privilege offers an one-sided picture as 
“not all oppressive regimes conduct economic policy in such a way that it 
leads to persistent poverty”. 345 According to critics, even in the worst case 
scenario where non-democratic leaders are reluctant to share the profits from 
the sale of natural resource with their people, the citizens of a country could 
still benefit from the process through technology transfer used during resource 
extraction for example. 346  Conversely, the refusal to trade with such 
oppressive regimes could lead to even worse prospects for the poor, for 
economic sanctions would leave them particularly vulnerable. 347 In response, I 
argue that the claims that Pogge makes based on the international resource 
privilege still stand for he draws upon a wide range of case studies such as 
“Congo/ Zaire, Kenya, Angola, Mozambique, Brazil, Venezuela, the 
Philippines, Burma/ Myanmar (and) the oil rich states of the Middle East” to 
back up his argument.348 Exceptions to the claims that Pogge makes can be 
better framed as qualifying his argument rather than refuting it per se. What I 
do concede to the critics, then, is that our practical response should be to 
decide our actions on a case-by-case basis.349 
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What justifies the presence of these negative duties? 
These two types of negative duties, interactive and institutional, arise because 
they characterise the two main types of interactions at the international level 
that could affect the global poor’s right to subsistence conceptually.350 The 
first type of interaction captures the behavior between “largely independent 
states”, where each state 1) runs their own domestic affairs autonomously and 
2) can choose to collaborate when it is to the mutual interest of the parties 
involved.351 As there are identifiable responsible agents in this case, it is the 
negative interactional duty that is involved here. Countries can choose to 
either leave each other alone or interact in ways that do not contribute to the 
worsening of the global poor’s position. The second type of interaction 
describes how individuals and states engage with each other across borders 
through “an overarching, supranational system of rules.”352 As it is the system 
of rules that dictate the nature of the interaction, it is the negative institutional 
duty that applies in this context. Finally, I set aside the question of whether it 
is primarily these two types of interactions that actually take place in 
international affairs for it is an empirical question that lies outside the scope of 
my thesis.  
 
The negative institutional duty proves to be more controversial of the two 
negative duties proposed thus far. Thus, I would like to address two main 
objections that can be made in relation to the negative institutional duty 
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proposed. The first objection comes from within the argument that I have 
made, which is if just war theory supports the idea of institutional duty in the 
first place. As I mainly discussed the conduct of combatants who directly put 
the lives of noncombatants at risk in the previous chapter, the shift in context 
(to those who are indirectly involved in putting the lives of others at risk) 
ought to be justified. In response to this objection, I argue that we can draw 
upon just war theory to provide a justification for our negative institutional 
duty. More specifically, I am referring to the concepts of political 
responsibility and democratic responsibility found in Walzer’s discussion of 
jus post bellum, or justice after war, to make a case for our negative 
institutional duty.  
 
Let me first explain what I mean by “political responsibility” for Walzer does 
not use this term specifically in his writings. In this case, I am referring to the 
responsibility that politicians bear as they make decisions on behalf of their 
citizens. 353  Democratic responsibility is used by Walzer to refer to the 
responsibility that citizens bear when they able to shape and influence policy 
decisions.354 There is some variation in terms of the amount of responsibility 
that citizens possess, for citizens in an authoritarian state will hold 
considerably less sway than their democratic counterparts. Consequently, the 
degree of moral responsibility that a citizen ought to bear is contingent upon 
“the possibility of free action in the communal realm.” 355 In the context of just 
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war, then, both politicians and their citizens are judged based on their 
adherence to jus ad bellum considerations (or their lack thereof).356 
 
How, then, is invoking the notion of political and democratic responsibility 
helpful in terms of justifying our negative institutional duty in the context of 
international distributive justice? The main point here is that being indirectly 
involved in risking others’ right to life does not excuse us from our moral 
responsibilities. Recall the negative institutional duty dictates that we refrain 
from supporting rules that in turn places foreseeable, avoidable and non-trivial 
constraints upon others.357 Likewise, both politicians and citizens are one step 
removed from the direct violence in terms of the roles they play. To elaborate, 
politicians initiate war through their decisions and citizens support their 
soldiers by providing the resources required; neither of these groups of actors 
participates in the war effort per se. However, both these groups are held 
accountable if they have engaged in a war that had no just cause as its basis. 
Politicians face the threat of punishment at war crime trials whereas citizens 
are expected to pay reparations to the victims of aggressive war.358 
 
The second objection frames the negative institutional duty as being overly 
expansive. Some scholars, such as Kok Chor Tan, argue that it is unclear if our 
negative institutional duty requires us to 1) withdraw support from an unjust 
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global order or 2) extends our withdrawal to a global order that is 
disadvantageous to the global poor (but is not necessary unjust).359 Examples 
that are used to illustrate the former could be more accurately reframed to fit 
the latter.360 For instance, some scholars claim that developed countries have 
created an unfair playing field for developing countries via regulatory 
organisations, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and its decision 
making procedures.361 The criticism here is that despite having procedures that 
appear fair in theory (such as the principle of nondiscrimination, which 
“ensures that each WTO member faces identical opportunities to trade with 
other WTO members” 362, the procedures often turn out to be different in 
practice, for developing countries with weaker bargaining powers tend to 
accept the little they can get, rather than risk being left out entirely.363 
Furthermore, such arrangements tend to perpetuate themselves via “the 
choices of the rich, via the efforts of their governments who represent their 
interests in international forums, their own consumption habits, and their 
indifference and so on” so long as it continues to be advantageous to them. 364 
According to Tan, what has been established here is that the global order 
(where the WTO is but one feature), offers advantages to the rich at the 
expense of the poor, not that it is unjust per se.365 The gap that remains to be 
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filled, then, is the connection between disadvantaging the poor and treating 
them in an unjust manner. 
 
My response to this objection is to reframe the question that Tan poses in 
order to resolve it. The question here is not how to move from a 
disadvantageous system of rules to establishing that the same system of rules 
is unjust. Rather, the question is how to use a theory of international 
distributive justice to make judgment calls on different system of rules.366 I 
will use an exaggerated version of what a theory of international distributive 
justice requires us to do to explain my argument for added clarity. Let us 
imagine that a theory of international distributive justice requires that 
everyone around the world should be delivered fresh flowers every morning 
for free.367 There is a range of designs that a global system of rules could take, 
including some that will fulfil the fresh flower requirement and others that 
would not. What our negative institutional duty obliges us to do, then, is to 
withdraw support from global systems of rules that are designed to deliver 
fresh flowers only to some and not others. 368 While I acknowledge that this 
implication seems absurd, it is internally consistent and follows logically from 
the (absurd) antecedent mentioned earlier.369 Circling back to Tan’s objection, 
I argue that we can distinguish between an unjust system of rules and a 
disadvantageous system of rules based on a predefined benchmark. I have 
made a case for the freedom to pursue our rights to subsistence as a predefined 
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benchmark earlier.370 Having established a benchmark, it follows that only a 
system of rules that foreseeably and avoidably constraints the freedom of the 
global poor to pursue their subsistence rights is one that would be unjust and 
not just any disadvantageous system of rules per se.  
 
Having addressed these two objections, the important question now is if the 
global rich do in fact violate the negative duties outlined in this section. It is to 
this issue that we now turn. 
 
4.3) Positive duties in international distributive justice: 
 The main insight derived from just war theory is that we come to have 
positive duties towards others when we violate their right to life (or in other 
words, fail to honour our own negative duties). I propose that there are two 
main types of positive duties owed to the global poor. The first positive duty is 
a positive interactional duty, which can best be described as taking the form 
of compensation. In this case, individuals or states that have failed to uphold 
their negative interactional duty should look towards making a proportionate 
compensation towards those whose rights to subsistence they have put at risk. 
The second positive duty is a positive institutional duty and can best be 
described as reformatory. Recall that it is not only the actions of particular 
states that jeopardise the freedom of others to pursue their right to subsistence, 
but also systems of rules that enable such interactions happen. What follows, 
then, is that the rules should be reformed so as to abide by our negative 
institutional duty. 
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The relevant question that follows is what it means to fail to honour our 
negative duties. More specifically, what are the thresholds in place and what 
justifies these thresholds over others? When it comes to my previous 
discussion on the principle of due care, I make a case that soldiers owe non-
combatants efforts at protection because they place the latter under 
foreseeable and deliberate risk that endangers their lives.  How, then, should 
we translate the concept of foreseeable and deliberate risk and apply it into the 
context of international distributive justice? I suggest that we do so by 
answering the following questions in relation to our interactional duty: 
1) What does it mean to foresee risk?  
2) What does it mean to place others under deliberate risk? 
 
I acknowledge that arguing for a negative institutional duty is controversial in 
that we do not typically consider a system of rules (and therefore, our 
participation in one) under the scope of moral judgment. Critics might argue 
that our role is so distant such that our causal responsibility fails to translate 
into moral responsibility in this case.  Thus, I choose to address the critics by 
tackling the following question in relation to our institutional duty: 
3) What does it mean to foreseeably and deliberately risk someone 
else’s right to subsistence through a system of rules (as opposed to our 
actions)? Are we still morally responsible for the consequences that 
follow? 
 
I will now consider each of them in turn. 
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What does it mean to foresee risk? 
Before I begin addressing what it means to foresee risk, I wish to address why 
foreseeability is a relevant moral consideration. In other words, why should 
foreseeability matter when it comes to making a moral judgment on others? In 
the context of legal theory, various scholars have made arguments that 
foreseeability provides consistency, simplicity and fairness in terms of making 
judgment.371 I choose to focus on fairness in this section for it provides the 
most compelling reason for using foreseeability as a guide to our duties in 
international redistributive justice. Foreseeability matters because it is one 
way of delineating what is within an agent’s control and what is not. It is only 
with the ability to imagine what lies ahead that we become enabled to prevent 
or facilitate the events that follow.372 If we allocated blame solely on an 
agent’s role in the casual process, we run the risk of making him or her 
“responsible for very large sums of damages, going far beyond what he (or 
she) could have contemplated or been prepared to meet in advance.”373 The 
implication for our moral judgments, then, is that we can use foresight as one 
factor in deciding whether to blame or excuse individuals for the negative 
consequences incurred as a result of their actions.374 Let me refer to two 
examples to illustrate this logic. First, let us consider a mother who gives her 
crying infant a strong drug in order to quell his sobs.375 If this mother was 
aware of the adverse side effects of the drug, or at least ought to be aware (for 
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example, if the medicinal bottle came with a warning on the side), we will 
hold her morally responsible for any negative consequences that might 
follow.376 Second, a father who gives away the hand of his daughter to a man 
he knows to be cruel will similarly be held as blameworthy. 377 Even though he 
does not cause harm to his daughter per se, his failure to prevent a foreseeable 
occurrence leaves him guilty to some extent. In both these cases, foreseeability 
plays a role in determining the moral responsibility of the agents involved. 
 
Second, what does it mean to foresee a risk? As with just war theory, whether 
a particular risk is foreseeable (or not) is an empirical question that is best 
answered in relation to a specific case. It is only the principles for discerning 
foreseeability can be generalised. Thus, it is only the latter that I will be 
discussing here. There are two key aspects we should take into consideration 
when it comes to foreseeing risk. First, agents are not required to foresee the 
specifics of an event or action in order to be held responsible for them. For 
example, we can be said to have the ability to foresee rainstorms when we see 
dark clouds, even though our ability to predict specifics such as how long the 
storm would last or what area it would cover remains limited.378 Agents can be 
held responsible if their actions fit a class of actions where negative 
consequences are “anticipated as one of the reasonable and probable 
results”.379 In other words, the question that we should ask is not “Was this 
risk foreseeable?” but rather, “Under what specific description which fits this 
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risk has experience taught us to anticipate risk?”.380 Second, the ability to 
foresee is contingent upon the information available to the agent at a 
particular point in time.381 What this means is that we need to place ourselves 
in their shoes and ask what it is that they can foresee, given their resources and 
capabilities, rather than ask what is foreseeable in the abstract. More 
specifically, the “information available” should shed insights on 1) the 
“apparent range” of the agent’s action and 2) the foreseeable victims affected 
by the action.382  
 
What does it mean to place others under deliberate risk? 
In answering this question, I would first like to unpack the term “deliberate”. 
In this case, I take deliberate to mean the conscious choice of one option over 
others, including the option to do nothing at all. The judgment therefore 
includes an assessment of feasible alternatives as well. 
 
First, let me differentiate between deliberate and non-deliberate actions by 
explaining what the latter entail. To elaborate, situations where we do not act 
in a deliberate manner are those where our actions are done accidentally, 
unconsciously, out of reflex or are involuntary due to pressure exerted by 
others (such as duress). 383 For example, when we jump because we thought 
we saw a face at the window and received a shock, we would not describe the 
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act of jumping as a deliberate one because it happened unconsciously. 384 
Similarly, when threatened by a robber at gunpoint to give up either our 
possessions or our lives, one’s decision to give up our possessions cannot be 
said to be voluntary as it was made under duress.385 I acknowledge that the 
standard for claiming duress is a controversial one and make no claims for a 
specific baseline per se. What I do wish to assert however, is that a legitimate 
appeal to duress (however we wish to define it) is one that would negate the 
voluntariness of an action. In this case, moral responsibility passes on from the 
agent who commits an action under duress to the agent that placed the former 
under duress.386 
 
Second, how do deliberate actions translate into the context of putting others 
at risk? I argue that the threshold involves foreseeing that others will be at risk 
as a result of one’s action and choosing to continue with one’s original course 
nonetheless.387 A higher threshold would entail intending that others be at risk 
in order for the action to qualify. Let me draw upon some examples to explain 
the difference between these thresholds before justifying my choice of 
threshold. The first example illustrates what it means to intentionally place 
others at risk. Let us assume that agent X wants to kill agent A with a 
firearm.388 There is a person, agent B, who is standing in between the two of 
them. If agent X wishes to accomplish the goal of killing agent A, the bullet 
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must necessarily pass through the body of agent B. 389 Agent X bears no 
grudges towards agent B and would gladly spare agent B if possible. 390 
However, agent X shoots and the bullet passes through agent B’s body, 
ultimately killing both agent A and agent B. In this case, agent X intentionally 
places agent B at risk, albeit not as an end in itself, but as a means necessary to 
the end that agent X wishes to achieve. The second example explains what it 
means to foresee placing others at risk. Let us imagine again that agent X 
wishes to kill agent A by means of a firearm. This time, however, agent B is 
standing nearby and not directly between agent X and agent A.391 Given that 
both agent A and B are of a significant distance away from agent X and fairly 
close to each other, there is a high likelihood that agent X may accidentally hit 
agent B instead of agent A if he or she fires.392 Agent X eventually chooses to 
fire, “wishing to hit the target, but hoping, indeed, that he will not hit B.”393 In 
this example, the risk of injuring or killing agent B can be characterised as a 
side effect, for the risk is foreseeable, but unintended in the sense that it is not 
required for agent X to accomplish his goal.394 I choose the lower threshold 
(foreseeing risk but choosing to go ahead) as placing others under deliberate 
risk because we are morally responsible for the side effects of our actions as 
well.395 More precisely, the second example can reformulated in terms of 
desiring A (accomplishing the goal of killing agent A) to the extent of 
overcoming aversion to B (foreseeing the risk of killing agent B). We 
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therefore act deliberately to bring about the cumulative effect “of which A and 
B are two inseparable factors.” 396  
 
Third, how do we relate the concept of placing others under deliberate risk to 
the context of international distributive justice? I will go through one example 
to explain how the contextualisation to international distributive justice would 
work. Political leaders currently have the authority to take out loans in the 
name of their country. 397 Let us assume there is evidence that whenever 
money is loaned to political leaders who have usurped power, most of it ends 
up being pocketed by them rather than being spent on the welfare of their 
citizens. Let us further assume that the risk of corruption is known to the 
creditors and institutions that make such loans possible. What, then, are the 
obligations of international actors given such a context? One case study that 
would be useful for our purposes here is Zaire under the reign of dictator 
Mobutu Sese Seko. According to a report from Transparency International, 
Mobutu siphoned $6 billion dollars off the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)’s $12 billion loan to his country during his 32 year reign.398 Despite 
being aware of such activities, the United States insisted that such loans 
continue, further contributing to the crippling debt that both successor 
governments and citizens of Zaire have to bear.399 The average Zairean 
citizen’s right to subsistence is jeopardised for two reasons. First, they have to 
shoulder international debts incurred via taxation, thereby lowering their 
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already limited store of resources. Second, successor governments are left 
with limited capacity to install structural changes that would allow the citizens 
of Zaire to better pursue their rights to subsistence.400  
 
The crucial question here is if feasible alternatives were open at both the 
interactional level (did the United States have the option of acting otherwise?) 
and at the institutional level (did the IMF have the option of prescribing 
conditions to loans to minimise corruption?). On the interactional level, it is 
generally difficult to make a case that the countries pushing for loans to be 
given out to other countries are compelled to do so. The creditor may stand to 
gain from the process, but such gains are merely preferential and not 
obligatory. On the institutional level, it is typical for the IMF to prescribe 
conditions when it comes to providing loans to developing countries.401 The 
current conditions are geared towards making sure the loans are repaid in the 
longer term by including components such as structural reform, trade 
liberalisation and austerity measures.402 What the status quo reveals, then, is 
that the IMF can set conditions. One way of reducing the adverse effects of 
the international resource privilege, then, is for the IMF to translate this 
capability into setting standards for legitimate power acquisition and reduction 
of corruption levels, so as to avoid risking the subsistence rights of the global 
poor. 
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What does it mean to foreseeably and deliberately risk someone else’s right to 
subsistence through a system of rules? Are we still morally responsible for the 
consequences that follow? 
 
One of the most powerful criticisms against our institutional duty (whether 
negative or positive) is institutions merely enable others to be at risk of losing 
their freedom to pursue their right to subsistence. The institutions do not 
themselves create the risk. According to scholar Magnus Reitberger, looking 
at institutions is a mistaken endeavour for “the main culprits in these cases 
seem to be the existence of more or less powerful sovereign states behaving 
badly” for it is not so much “the case of an institutional order being harmful 
and the case of an institutional order being exploited and manipulated for 
harmful purposes by powerful actors.”403 An analogy that can be drawn here is 
that of producing knives: some of which will be legitimately used for purposes 
such as cooking, whereas some could be used it for ill intent.404 Critics assert 
that there is an important distinction between enabling others to be at risk (by 
producing the knives) and creating risk to their lives (by using knives to injure 
others) that needs to be made. In other word, the two should not be tainted 
with the same brush. The implication of such a diagnosis is that the negative 
institutional duty is considerably weakened, perhaps to the extent of being “no 
more stringent than positive duties of assistance.”405 
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I respond to the above criticism by acknowledging that there is indeed a 
conceptual difference between enabling risk and creating risk. What I seek to 
dispute however, is the claim that we are not morally responsible for the 
former. One example could be that of a factory that does not meet safety 
standards required of it, by placing too many machines on the shop floor and 
hindering access to escape routes for instance. 406  Although the lack of 
adequate safety standards creates no major damage on a regular basis, the 
haphazard state of affairs turns into a disaster when crises, such as the break 
out of a fire, occur.407 The lack of safety standards is more accurately 
described as enabling risk rather than creating risk per se for it is the fire that 
ultimately endangers lives and property. However, we would still find the 
factory owner’s slip in maintaining safety standards morally objectionable. 
Why is this the case? I suggest that there is a more nuanced argument to be 
made here, we are not always morally responsible for enabling risk unless they 
fulfill further conditions of some kind. More specifically, I propose that the 
same principles that I have been discussing throughout this chapter apply as a 
litmus test here: if our actions foreseeably and deliberately enable risk that 
was within our power to avoid, we should be held morally responsible for the 
consequences that follow. 
 
One key objection to our institutional duty is that our involvement in a system 
of rules leads to unforeseeable effects. We are unable to foresee the 
consequences for our actions because we are both 1) indirectly (as opposed to 
directly) involved in placing others at risk and that 2) there is a great distance 
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between the enabling action and eventual risk created. With regards to the first 
reason, I argue that it is not the indirect nature per se that negates our ability to 
foresee. Consider, for example, the case of a person loaning his or her knife to 
another person (with a strong suspicion that it may be used in a murder 
attempt). 408 We are likely to hold the person who loans the knife complicit in 
wrongdoing even though he or she plays no part in the act of murder.409 In 
contrast, one who causes a passenger to miss a flight (through administrative 
error for example), is not typically considered responsible for any mishaps that 
may occur on the replacement flight.410 Our moral judgments about these two 
cases differ because there is some certainty in the first case about increased 
probability of placing another individual at risk whereas a change in flight 
timings bears little correlation to the probability of a plane crash.411  
 
With regards to the second reason of there a being great distance between the 
enabling action and eventual risk created, I acknowledge that proximity 
between the two matters. More specifically, I concede that there are some 
situations where the enabling factor is so distant that we would discount moral 
responsibility involved because the consequences are simply unforeseeable. 412 
One example would be that of a doctor who did not provide contraception as 
effective as his patient requested.413 Although an unplanned pregnancy could 
be attributed to the negligence of the doctor, the actions of the child (for 
                                                
408 Steve Daskal, “Confining Pogge’s Analysis of Global Poverty to Genuinely Negative 
Duties”,  Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 16 (2013): 380. 
409 Ibid., 380. 
410 Antony Honoré, “Causation in Law (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)” Updated 17 







example, growing up to be a mass murderer) cannot be. 414 In response, I 
acknowledge that there are limits to moral responsibility when consequences 
become “too remote”, but critics overstate their case when they extend these 
limits to the point of denying that there are moral responsibilities in the first 
place.415 
 
A second objection to our institutional duty is that our involvement in a 
system of rules appears unavoidable, especially so if we are referring to 
“unjust economic institutions that are global in scope”.416 I will first illustrate 
an example of what it means to withdraw support from an unjust institution 
before addressing why some would find our involvement in institutions 
inevitable. The example I am referring to is Britain in the nineteenth century, 
where the country decided to enforce, “unilaterally and worldwide, a ban on 
all maritime slave trade irrespective of a vessel’s ownership, registration, port 
of origin or destination.”417 I should also add that such a move was not to the 
interest of either Britain’s elite or its people, for they bore both the expense of 
enforcement and opportunity cost in terms of lost trade with their Latin 
American partners. 418 In outlining this example, I do not wish to make the 
claim that withdrawal from an unjust institution needs to be as comprehensive 
as Britain’s case. What I do wish to argue, however, is that our participation in 
any given global institution is not inevitable per se. More specifically 
however, I want to address the concern that withdrawing from unjust global 
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institutions leaves us vulnerable to overly demanding demands. I will use a 
simplified example to explain my argument before relating it back to 
international distributive justice. Let us begin by assuming that we are obliged 
to save individuals in a burning building when we can do so at little risk to our 
own safety. One way to discharge such a duty is to perform it ourselves, but it 
is a tall order to require that every individual stop whatever they happen to be 
doing in order to save others whenever they see a fire. 419 The second way to 
discharge a duty is to enable a smaller group of individuals to discharge our 
duty on our behalf. 420  For example, what we could do is to set up a 
specialised group who are trained (firemen) and given adequate resources 
(through the provision of fire fighting equipment) to do so. The second way is 
more desirable not only for being less demanding on the average individual, 
who need only provide the relevant resources to support the specialised group, 
but also more efficient, for it is the experts rather than amateurs tackling the 
issue. We could likewise translate this second strategy in the context of 
international distributive justice. What it means to withdraw from unjust 
institutions need not be overwhelmingly demanding if we set up specialised 
taskforces who would design and implement reforms on our behalf. Our 
obligations, then, lie only in ensuring that members of the taskforce receive 
the support that they need to carry out their work.  
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Having addressed the main conditions that would allow the enabling of risk to 
be considered wrongdoing, I now move onto discussing the limits to our 
positive duties. 
 
4.4) Limits to duties in international distributive justice: 
The goal of this section is to explain how the right to life in the form of 
subsistence rights applies as a limit to the positive duties in international 
distributive justice. Let me begin by providing a quick recap of the argument 
made in the context of just war theory, where the limits to duty is framed as 
the principle of due risk.421 The term due risk can be understood to delineate a 
space where combatants are expected to bear additional risk to safeguard the 
non-combatants whose lives they endanger but not to the extent of forfeiting 
the military mission or almost certainly losing their lives.422 I also argued that 
it is the combatants’ right to life that places a limit to their positive duty, for 
their right to life ought to be respected alongside the very same right that they 
owe to the non-combatants. How, then, does such an insight, using the right to 
life as a basis for limiting positive duty, translate into the international 
distributive justice context?  
 
My answer here consists of two components, where I bracket this insight in 
terms of our positive interactional duty and apply it only to the context of our 
positive institutional duty, rather than apply it generally. With regards to the 
first component, I do so because proportionality serves as a better guide to 
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422 Ibid., 157. 
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think about the limits to positive interactional duty incurred from our failure to 
abide by our negative interactional duty. As mentioned previously, positive 
duty in this case serves as a form of direct compensation to those who suffered 
from the harm done. It is more straightforward and intuitive to use 
proportionality as a guide to the appropriate amount of compensation rather 
than try to force fit the right to subsistence here. As for the second component 
on limits to positive institutional duty, my main goal is to show that 
subsistence rights provide an effective way to adjudicate between what is 
required of us and what is merely good to have. It is to the question that we 
now turn. 
 
How does the limit to positive institutional duty apply in practice? 
I answer this question by examining the pharmaceutical industry as a case 
study to see how the limits to positive institutional duty would apply 
practically. Let us first begin with an overview on the global pharmaceutical 
industry. The current system of intellectual property rights abides by the 
regulations set in the TRIPS (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights) Agreement.423 One of the defining characteristics of TRIPS is that 
developing countries “are required to enforce monopoly patents on 
pharmaceuticals.” 424 Although there is a clause that allows for exemptions to 
patents for the sake of public health, such exemptions remain the exception 
instead of the rule.425  
                                                
423 Steve Daskal, “Confining Pogge’s Analysis of Global Poverty to Genuinely Negative 
Duties”,  Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 16 (2013): 385. 
424 Ibid., 385. 
425 The relevant clause in TRIPS can be found in World Trade Organisation. “Intellectual 
Property (TRIPS) Fact Sheet – Pharmaceuticals -2” Updated Sep 2006. 




My goal is to show how the right to subsistence helps to provide us with 
clarity as to what reforms lie within the scope of our positive duty and what 
reforms lie beyond that. I do so with reference to the two problems associated 
with the TRIPS Agreement. The first problem is that the current clauses forbid 
developing countries from replicating the medication for diseases that affect 
the global poor.426 The loss of cheaper alternatives means that the global poor 
will often be unable to afford medications for curable diseases even though 
such medications already exist, causing them prolonged suffer from illnesses 
or even death.427 The second problem is how there is little financial incentive 
to conduct research on drugs that involve the global poor as its main 
recipients.428 The implication is that medical innovation tends to take place for 
relatively less severe health problems that affect the global rich, instead of life 
threatening illnesses that affect the global poor.429  
 
There are two points that I will make in relation to this case study. First, the 
question of what to reform can best be understood with reference to the 
negative institutional duty I outlined previously. In this case, only the first 
problem causes risk to one’s right to life (by withholding the availability of 
cheap alternatives) whereas the second problem is an issue of beneficence (not 
                                                                                                                           
2015. The argument made for such exemptions being exceptional can be found it Steve 
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supporting worthwhile initiatives to aid the global poor).430 Consequently, 
only the first problem falls within the scope of our discussion.  
 
Second, the question of to what extent does the TRIPS Agreement need to be 
reformed is a question that can be addressed with reference to the right to 
subsistence. Recall that the right to subsistence refers to having a right to 
access necessities, such as basic healthcare. There are several issues that need 
to be balanced here. On the one hand, pharmaceutical manufacturers spend a 
considerable sum investing into research and development and are entitled to 
make a certain profit to the drugs they invent. The fear with allowing 
developing countries to manufacture cheaper alternatives is that these cheaper 
versions will somehow (illegally) enter the market of developed countries and 
lower the profit margins of the pharmaceutical companies. In other words, 
price discrimination is not an attractive option here. On the other hand, the 
global poor suffer needlessly from preventable diseases, reducing their ability 
to lead meaningful lives for themselves. My suggestion, then, is for reformers 
to strive for a middle ground position between these two poles. Rather than 
think of access to medication as an all or nothing affair, the TRIPS Agreement 
can be revised to include a quota for the quantity of cheap alternatives 
produced in developing countries, contingent upon factors such as size of 
population affected, severity of the disease, how infectious the disease is and 
so on.  
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At this point, one may ask why I do not go beyond a quota and mandate that 
research into life-threatening diseases that affect the global poor global be 
carried out as well? After all, it is unclear how the distinction between 
providing drugs that already exist and inventing new drugs makes a relevant 
difference, especially since both tackle similar health problems. Although I 
addressed this point earlier with reference to our negative institutional duty, I 
believe we can also use the right to subsistence as a way to adjudicate between 
competing claims on our positive institutional duty to reform. For example, 
the first problem can be reframed as blocking access to medication that is 
already in existence, thereby violating a right to subsistence. In contrast, the 
second problem can be reframed as creating access to medication that has not 
been invented yet. While such a goal is laudable, it is not required by the 
limits dictated by our positive institutional duty.  
 
4.5) Conclusion: 
The goal of this chapter was to examine the negative, positive and limits to 
duty we may owe to the global poor. In taking up task, I argued for three main 
points. First, we have two types of negative duties, interactional and 
institutional. Second, our positive duties follow when we fail to abide by our 
negative duties, with creation and enabling of foreseeable and deliberate risk 
as the criteria involved. Our positive duties are likewise interactional and 
institutional in form. Finally, proportionality serves as a guide for our positive 
interactional duty to compensate, whereas a right to subsistence limits our 




In closing, I note that there may be some skepticism towards the account 
presented here for the idea that we acquire positive duties when we violate our 
negative ones is hardly original. In response to this criticism, I argue that the 
normative gain of this chapter is not that of substance, but that of justification. 
More specifically, the value that this thesis brings to Pogge’s analysis of 
global poverty includes two further insights. First, I reject the harm based 
perspective (that Pogge adopts) for a coercion based perspective, as the latter 
coheres better with the distinction between legitimate and non-legitimate 
actions. Second, the concept of causation has not generally been carefully 
analysed in the international distributive justice literature and yet it remains an 
important basis on which various theories, such as Pogge’s account, function. 
My contribution to the literature, then, is to borrow from a more sophisticated 
understanding of causation from legal theory and applying it to the field of 















Different countries have come together at the start of the millennium to set 
eight goals related to international development. These eight goals, also 
known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), cover themes such as 
poverty alleviation, universal education, gender equality, health and 
environmental sustainability.431 This year, 2015, marks the end of the 15 years 
timeframe for the MDG to be achieved. Despite its various successes, there 
are still 800 million people who are defined as living in poverty.432 The 
academic conversation on international distributive justice occurs in this 
context. On one side there are advocates for global poverty alleviation, with 
their arguments stemming from premises such as the intrinsic worth of each 
human being. On the other there are scholars who argue that principles of 
distributive justice ought only to apply to people who share special 
relationships which each other, such as fellow nationals, thereby limiting our 
obligation to aid those who reside beyond our boundaries. How should one 
adjudicate between such views? 
 
The goal of this thesis is to answer the above question by using just war theory 
as a lens to think about international distributive justice. As the just war theory 
literature possesses internal coherence that the international distributive 
justice literature currently does not have, the reasoning, then, is for us to 
elucidate the moral principles that provide coherence in the just war context in 
order to translate them to the realm of international distribution. I have done 
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this by covering two broad themes. First, I turned my attention to just causes 
for war (jus ad bellum) to consider a foundation for theories of international 
distributive justice. More specifically, Chapter One aimed at uncovering a 
common foundation behind the different causes for which one could wage a 
just war, such as defence against aggression, secession, counter-intervention 
and humanitarian intervention. Having considered these various causes, I 
argued that communal autonomy was the thread that connects them together. 
In Chapter Two, I relied on the concept of communal autonomy to argue that a 
relational approach is favoured over its non-relational counterpart and that we 
owe only minimal duties to those beyond our borders. 
 
Second, I examined just conduct in war (jus in bello) for insights that would 
inform how duties should be conceptualised in international distributive 
justice. More precisely, Chapter Three studied how combatants derive their 
negative, positive and limits to duty in the context of noncombatant immunity. 
I argued that our right to life, in the form of a right to physical security in just 
war, informs the combatants’ negative, positive and limits to duty to non-
combatants. I then attempted to translate these insights into the discussion of 
international distributive justice in Chapter Four, where I made the following 
points: First, I argued that we can define a right to life in the context of 
international distributive as a right to subsistence. Second, I proposed that we 
respect the subsistence rights of others when we abide by our negative 
interactional duty (capturing the dynamic between agents) and our negative 
institutional duty (capturing the dynamic between systems and agents). Third, 
our positive duties emerge when we fail to live up to our negative duties, 
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giving rise to positive interactional duty and positive institutional duty. 
Finally, proportionality serves as a check to our positive interactional duty, 
whereas a right to life (in the form of subsistence rights) serves to limit our 
positive institutional duty. 
 
A question that remains is how the two key insights of my thesis, that we 
possess both communal autonomy and a right to life, relate to each other. I 
suggest that we can think of a right to life serving as a check for the limits for 
community autonomy. To unpack the term, autonomy can refer to both an 
empirical reality (“the ability to choose) and a right (to “exercise that ability 
without external interference”).433 One way to think about the two aspects of 
autonomy is to see the right following from the empirical reality, for those 
who are seen as being too young or mentally disabled typically also have a 
qualified right to make decisions for themselves. To elaborate, one could draw 
an analogy between an individual’s autonomy and communal autonomy in 
terms of the similar attributes they share. The right to individual autonomy 
signifies being capable enough to make their own decisions and possessing the 
maturity to take responsibility for one’s deeds. 434 Likewise, the right to 
communal autonomy suggests that a community has reached a stage where the 
members are able to collectively “determine their own destinies.”435 Being 
autonomous does not mean one can act without limits. The limit that my thesis 
has suggested is that of a right to life and more specifically, a right to 
subsistence in the context of international distributive justice. To elaborate, I 
imagine this limit serving to check the scope of communal autonomy in two 
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main ways. The first way in which this limit works is outward in orientation. 
To elaborate, one can see this thesis as advocating for communal autonomy to 
the extent that one community does not infringe another’s community right to 
subsistence. This view has been explained and expanded upon in Chapter 4 of 
this thesis. The second way this limit works is inward in orientation. The area 
of concern here is when some members of a community have their rights to 
subsistence encroached upon due to distributive practices  and judgments of 
the community. A case in point could be the caste system in India, where 
prejudice against the lower castes may run so deep so as to jeopardise their 
quest for subsistence.436 The direction that my thesis suggests, then, is that 
humanitarian intervention can be considered at this point so as to bring all 
members of a community up to a minimum level for survival. Ensuring their 
survival means that the  disadvantaged at least retain the possibility of 
negotiating with their fellow community members over the future of their 
community thereafter. 
 
In closing, I would like to relate to significance of this thesis to the 
international distributive justice literature. There is currently little consensus 
on what the organising questions of the field should be. A quick survey of the 
field reveals that disagreement range from the types of duties involved 
(humanitarian duties versus duties of justice), where these duties come from 
(relational versus non-relational duties), the nature of the subjects of justice 
(cosmopolitans versus statists) and the question of what the scope of the duties 
are (global egalitarians versus global minimalists, positive duties versus 
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negative duties).437 In contrast, the just war theory literature has a clear three-
pronged framework on causes for war (jus ad bellum), conduct in war (jus in 
bello) and how to end war (jus post bellum) that allows for debates to be held 
in a coherent fashion. My proposal, then, is to reorganise the academic 
conversation by looking at foundation(s) for justice, negative duties, positive 
duties and limits to duty as a way of enabling scholars to engage rather than 
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